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INADEQUATE HOUSING, ISRAEL,
AND THE BEDOUIN OF THE NEGEV©
BY TAWFIQ S. RANGWALA*
This article examines Israel's treatment of its Arab
Bedouin citizens living in the Negev desert through the
lens of the international human right to adequate
housing. The Negev Bedouin, an agrarian indigenous
community, is the most socially, politically and
economically disadvantaged segment of the Arab
minority in Israel. Their precarious situation is rooted
primarily in Israeli land planning pursuits that have
ignored Bedouin land claims in favor of settlement
programs reserved exclusively for the majority
population.
This article documents the manner in which the
overarching legal and political character of the state has
led to the development of a legislative, judicial, and
public policy regime aimed at forcibly evicting the
Bedouin from their traditional homes in so-called
"unrecognized villages" and transferring them to
impoverished urban townships. Reviewing Israel's
international human rights obligations, particularly the
right to adequate housing, this article critically assesses
whether Israel's current policies towards the Bedouin are
consistent with those obligations.
Cet article examine le traitement d'lsradl envers
ses citoyens arabes bedouins vivant dans le d6sert du
N~guev du point de vue du droit humanitaire
international A un logement ad~quat. Les bedouins du
N~guev, une communaut6 indigine agraire, sont le
segment de la minorit6 arabe en Isradl le plus
socialement, politiquement et 6conomiquement
drsavantag6. Leur situation prrcaire est principalement
causre par les poursuites de planification territoriales
israrliennes qui ont ignore les revendications
territoriales b~douines en faveur de plans de
colonisations reserves exclusivement A la population
majoritaire.
Cet article documente la mani~re avec laquelle le
caractire Idgal et politique sous-jacent de l'6tat a men6
au d~veloppement d'un regime I6gislatif, judiciaire, et
d'ordre public vis6 A expulser de force les b~douins de
leurs habitations traditionnelles, des soi-disant - villages
non reconnus - et les transfrer dans des communes
urbaines appauvries. Passant en revue les obligations
isradliennes provenant des droits humanitaires
internationaux, particuli~rement le droit A un logement
ad~quat, cet article 6value d'un oil critique si la
politique courante d'Isradl envers les brdouins est
consistante avec ces obligations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Within the seemingly endless cycle of violence between Israelis and
Palestinians, an overwhelming amount of academic attention has focused
on international human rights issues arising from the Israeli occupation of
the West Bank and Gaza. Meanwhile, issues relating to Israel's treatment
of Palestinian citizens within its borders (approximately one million people)
have often been neglected.' A minority within the Palestinian minority, the
Arab Bedouin citizens of Israel have faced severe challenges that have been
the subject of even less analysis and discussion. The central aim of this
article is to explore the manner in which Israeli governmental policies
towards the Arab Bedouin population of the Negev (Arabic "Naqab")2
violate international human rights law. Specifically, this article examines
how the Zionist character of the state has given rise to a series of legislative
and policy choices that infringe the Bedouin basic human right to adequate
housing.
A historically agrarian and semi-nomadic society, the Bedouin
community of the Negev is the most socially, politically, and economically
The confines of this article preclude a detailed discussion of the Palestinian minority generally,
but for thorough accounts of the dilemmas faced by Palestinian citizens of Israel, see Rashid Khalidi,
Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modem National Consciousness (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1997); Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israe4 trans. by Inea Bushnaq (London: Monthly
Review Press, 1976); David Kretzmer, The Legal Status oftheArabs in Israel (Boulder: Westview Press,
1990); Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 1980); Hussein Abu Hussein & Fiona McKay, Access Denied; Palestinian Land Rights
in Israel (London: Zed Books, 2003) [Access Denied].
2 In order to be consistent with the majority of previous academic literature and media coverage
on the subject, I use the Hebrew term "Negev" in this paper. The Negev is the semi-arid southernmost
region of Israel, comprising approximately 60 per cent of the country's area.
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disadvantaged segment of the Palestinian minority in Israel.3 Like many
Bedouin communities throughout the Middle East, the Negev Bedouin are
a tribal group whose traditional (and now, in many senses, historical)
lifestyle is that of nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralism. Bedouin societies
are often marginalized and viewed as incompatible with the machinery and
planning objectives of modern states. In the Israeli context, this dynamic is
further complicated by the backdrop of the broader Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. While many Israeli scholars and government officials have sought
to minimize the hardships faced by the Negev Bedouin as the "practical
problem of dealing with a nomadic minority in a modern industrialized
state," this assessment is misleading because the nomadic patterns of the
Negev Bedouin had generally ended prior to the creation of the state.4
With this in mind, it is important to note that the Bedouin cannot
be accurately viewed as a separate ethnic minority; they themselves identify
as part of the national Palestinian minority.5 The distinction between the
Bedouin and the Palestinian minority as a whole-seen by many as a
central aspect of a "divide and rule" strategy-is only relevant insofar as it
relates to the disproportionate and severe impact state policies have on
Bedouin living standards. 6 It is this consideration that grounds my use of
the Bedouin as a compelling case study for assessing the scope and nature
3 All further references in this paper to the "Arab Bedouin" or the "Bedouin" refer to the Bedouin
community of the Negev, as opposed to the Bedouin of the Galilee region. These two groups have
different origins and speak slightly different dialects of Arabic. The Negev Bedouin are far less
integrated within Palestinian society given their isolated position in the Negev. See Penny Maddrell, The
Bedouin of the Negev (London: Minority Rights Group, 1990) at 4.
Ibid. See also text accompanying notes 102-10.
See Maddrell, supra note 3 at 19, noting that the Bedouin typically identify themselves as
Palestinian. The Israeli government has chosen to characterize the Bedouin as distinct from the
Palestinian minority in order to foster divisions and prevent mobilization against discriminatory state
activity. Despite their geographic distance from the majority of Palestinian citizens of Israel and their
distinct cultural practices, the Bedouin are very much a part of the Palestinian minority, and the policies
and mechanisms used by the state against the Bedouin are often the same as those employed against
the Palestinian minority generally. See also J. Cook, "Bedouin in the Negev Face New Transfer" Middle
East Research and Information Project (MERIP) (10 May 2003) online: Middle East Report Online
<http://www.merip.org/mero/ mero051003.html>; and A. O'Sullivan, "Beware the Palestinization of
the Negev Beduin" The Jerusalem Post (28 August 2003).
6 Maddrell points out that while the Bedouin face minority status in Israel generally, they must also
deal with the hardships presented by their minority status within the larger Palestinian community. The
Bedouin are often looked down upon by both Arab and Jewish citizens as primitive, and are "truely a
minority twice over." Maddrell explains that from the Bedouin perspective, their problems have been
similar to those encountered by the Palestinian minority generally, and the "similarities far outweigh
those differences arising from their divulging economic and social traditions." Ibid. at 4. See also Ghazi
Falah, "How Israel Controls the Bedouin" (1985) 14:2 J. Palestine Stud. 35 at 36, noting that "Bedouin
problems in Israel are not so much those of being Bedouin but rather those of being Arabs in a Zionist
state."
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of potential Israeli violations of the right to adequate housing.
In focusing on the Bedouin and the right to adequate housing, I am
not suggesting that adequate housing is the only sphere in which Israel
potentially commits human rights violations against both its Bedouin
citizens and the Palestinian minority generally. However, the right to
adequate housing is a key element in defending a myriad of human rights
of which the Bedouin are being deprived. The interdependent relationship
between human rights of all kinds is a well-established principle of
international law. 7 Adequate housing-a right that encompasses much
more than simple shelter-is the foundation for many of these rights
because the lack of a secure and stable environment in which to live hinders
one's ability (both individually and collectively) to assert other rights
functionally. It is also intrinsically connected with the possibility of realizing
an adequate standard of living, and, by extension, impacts the potential for
substantive human development. The choices, freedom, and social health
of communities are so dependent on the right to adequate housing that it
can be seen as both a fundamental human right and a pillar of human
development.8
Part II of this article provides a historical account of the Bedouin
and their relationship with the Israeli state. It also examines statistical
evidence to assess their standard of living, and contrasts such evidence with
that of the Israeli population as a whole. Part III explores the overarching
legal character of the Israeli state; the legislation, policies, and
jurisprudence that emerge from this character; and its impact on the
Bedouin right to adequate housing. Part IV looks at the right to adequate
housing within the framework of international human rights law and traces
its development and application to Israel. In Part V, observations and
conclusions are drawn from the conflict between Israel's international legal
commitment to adequate housing and its policies. Part VI concludes by
looking ahead and offering recommendations for the future.
7 For detailed and thorough analysis of the key features of economic, social, and cultural rights,
as well as arguments for the indivisibility, interdependence, and impermeability of all human rights
(civil, political, economic, social, and cultural), see Scott Leckie, "Another Step Towards Indivisibility:
Identifying the Key Features of Violations of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights" (1998) 20 Hum.
Rts. Q. 81; and Craig Scott, "The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards
a Partial Fusion of the International Covenants on Human Rights" (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall L.J. 769.
8 See Clarence J. Dias & Scott Leckie, "Human Development and Shelter: A Human Rights
Perspective (Occasional Paper 21)" online: <http://hdr.undp.org/docs/publications/
ocationalpapers/oc2lc.htm> at Part II; and Scott Leckie, "The UN Committee on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights and the Right to Adequate Housing: Towards an Appropriate Approach" (1989)
11 Hum. Rts. Q. 522.
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II. THE BEDOUIN OF THE NEGEV: AN OVERVIEW
The Bedouin are the indigenous inhabitants of the Negev and
currently comprise 12 per cent of the Palestinian minority in Israel.9 Prior
to the creation of Israel in 1948, 90 per cent of the Bedouin population
lived as subsistence farmers, while 10 per cent earned their living from
raising livestock.10 Today, 90 per cent of the population works as wage
labourers and Bedouin society has undergone rapid urbanization and
modernization, primarily as a result of Israeli land planning policy.ll Under
Ottoman rule and throughout the British mandate period, the Bedouin
enjoyed the use of approximately 12,600,000 dunums12 of land, which
satisfied both their agricultural and livestock raising needs.13 Today, they
are struggling to retain possession of the 240,000 dunums they currently
own or occupy "illegally., 1 4 Israeli settlement policy and land planning
pursuits have been the major cause of the dramatic reduction in land
ownership and have effectively severed Bedouin ties to the land by making
their traditional forms of employment untenable.
The majority of the Bedouin were driven out of the emerging Israeli
state during the 1948 war.15 Only 11,000 Bedouin remained from a
population of approximately 95,000.16 After the war, many Bedouin
continued to be expelled, in part based on the authorities' refusal to
provide them with Israeli identity cards. 17 Since anyone found without
9 Information provided to the author by the Association of Forty, online:
<http://www.assoc40.org> HOF Statistics]. A helpful resource for information regarding the Negev
Bedouin is Arab Association for Human Rights, "Article 26: Factsheet No.3: The Arab Bedouin of the




11HRA Factsheet, supra note 9. See discussion in Part III, below.
12 A dunum is an Ottoman measuring unit equaling one square kilometre. Four dunums equals
one acre.
13 Maddrell, supra note 3 at 5.Access Denied, supra note 1 at 127, states that approximately two
million dunums were estimated to be in the possession of the Bedouin before 1948.
14 See Orly Almi, "No Man's Land: Health In the Unrecognized Villages of the Negev"
(Physicians for Human Rights - Israel, July 2003), online: <http://www.phr.org.il/Phr/
downloads/dl_155.doc> at 12 [No Man's Land]. The residents of the unrecognized villages currently
hold 180,000 dunums of land, or 1.3 per cent of the total area of the Negev.
15During the 1948 Arab-Israeli war almost 80 per cent of the Palestinian population fled or was
expelled.
16 Falah, supra note 6 at 37.
17 Maddrell, supra note 3 at 6.
2004]
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identity cards could be expelled to Jordan or Egypt, countless Bedouin were
expelled by the time they might have been issued such a card in 1952.1"
Those remaining were uprooted from their homes and placed under
military rule in an enclosure zone (seyag) for eighteen years.19 Eleven tribes
west of Be'er Sheva (in Arabic "Beer el-Saba") were uprooted immediately
and their inhabitants made landless overnight.20 The entire enclosure area
encompassed only 10 per cent of the land formerly at the exclusive disposal
of the Bedouin community.
During this period, as discussed below, Israel enacted a series of
laws and military regulations which served to make Bedouin land claims
invisible, and ultimately led to the registration of Bedouin land as state
property. The Bedouin, restricted to the enclosure area while such laws
took effect, were unable to contest or even learn of the state's registration
of what they viewed as privately owned lands. Sabri Jaryis, a leading scholar
and researcher on the Arab population in Israel, comments that "[m]ore
than any other group, the Negev Bedouin suffered the full and unrestrained
harshness of military rule.,
21
The Bedouin population in the Negev currently constitutes nearly
140,000 people.22 Approximately 70,000 live in seven government-planned
towns established to resettle and centralize the Bedouin population.23
These seven towns consistently rank at the bottom of every socio-economic
indicator used by the state, and suffer the highest unemployment rates and
lowest income levels in Israel.24 While these government towns are supplied
with some basic urban services, they lack an economic infrastructure-a
fundamental point because the Bedouin re-location to these towns entails
18 Although identity cards were issued in 1952, many expulsions into Egypt and Jordan continued
beyond that date. As many as 7,000 Bedouin may have been expelled in 1953, and mass expulsions to
Egypt and Jordan are recorded as late as 1959. See Falah, supra note 6 at 43; Maddrell, supra note 3 at
6.
Maddrell, supra note 3 at 7; see also Ghazi Falah, "Israeli State Policy toward Bedouin
Sedentarization in the Negev" (1989) 18:2 J. Palestine Stud. 71 at 78-79.
20 Falah, supra note 6 at 38.
21 Jiryis, supra note 1 at 122.
22 AOF Statistics, supra note 9.
23 See Access Denied, supra note 1 at 127. According to the order of their establishment, these
towns are: Tel Sheva, Rahat, Segev-Shalom, Kuseifa, Arara in the Negev, Houra, and Laqiya.
24 See Ismael Abu-Saad & Harvey Lithwick,A New WayAhead: Development Plan for the Bedouin
Towns in the Negev (Center for Bedouin Studies and Development, 2000) at 9-16; and H. Lithwick,An
Urban Development Strategy for the Negev's Bedouin Community (Center for Bedouin Studies and
Development, 2000) at 9-12. See also D. Ben-Tal, "The Beduin: A Traumatic Transition"Jerusalem Post
(6 August 1999).
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the loss of their traditional agrarian livelihood.'
The other half of the Bedouin population lives in a series of villages
unrecognized by the state.26 Although unrecognized, the majority of these
villages were erected prior to the creation of the state, and virtually all prior
to the creation of the government-established towns.27 These villages are
denied all forms of basic infrastructure and are unable to build or develop
in any way.28 The villages are characterized by a lack of basic services, such
as running water, electricity, telephone lines, paved roads, schools, and
other public institutions.2 Since it is impossible to obtain building permits
for these villages, hundreds of Bedouin are indicted yearly for "illegal"
construction, and countless homes are subject to demolition orders.3 °
Current estimates by the Israeli government suggest that there are
approximately 60,000 unlicenced structures (25,000 of which are homes)
subject to potential demolition in the unrecognized villages of the Negev.3'
Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics does not publish information on these
villages, nor do they appear on official maps or road signs.32 This factor
makes research difficult and places an often insurmountable evidentiary
burden on Bedouin litigants, because their human rights struggle is easily
characterized as a claim for mere "squatter's rights."
There are approximately forty-seven unrecognized villages in the
25 Abu-Saad, ibid. See also U. Schmetzer, "Bedouins Stay Put in Fight Over Land: The Once-
Nomadic Tribesfolk Resist Israeli Government Efforts to Move them to Seven Towns Built for Them
- And Cling to Dreams of Farming in a Desert Marked for Development" Chicago Tribune (29 July
2003) 5.
2 6 Access Denied, supra note I at 255-81. See generally Adalah: Legal Center for Arab Minority
Rights in Israel, Institutionalized Discrimination:Adalah s Report to the World ConferenceAgainstRacism
(August/September 2001) reviewing legislation through which certain villages became "unrecognized"
[Adalah's Report].
2 7 Access Denied, supra note 1 at 255-81.
281bid.
2 9 Ibid.
30 Ibid. See also Adalah's Report, supra note 26 at 37; Cook, supra note 5; Ronen Shamir,
"Suspended in Space: Bedouins Under the Law of Israel" (1996) 30 L. & Soc'y. Rev. 231 at 246-47 and
accompanying text; and Amnesty International, Israel and the Occupied Territories: Under the Rubble -
House Demolitions and Destruction of Land and Property (Amnesty International, May 2004) at 44
[Amnesty Report].
31 Amnesty Report, ibid.
32 See e.g. Map of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBs), online:
<http://gis.cbs.gov.il/shnaton53/all israel.jpg> (Hebrew). While the CBS ignores the unrecognized
villages, the Ministries of Education, Agriculture, Interior, and Labour and Welfare continue to
maintain data on them. A map of the unrecognized villages in the Negev is available on the website of
the Regional Council for the Unrecognized Villages, online: <http://www.arabhra.org/rcuv/map.htm>.
2004]
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Negev, with populations ranging from sixty to six thousand.33 Government
officials claim that the villages are unrecognized because they are too small
and distant to be afforded government services.34 However, the Jewish
settlement of Lavon is recognized despite the fact that only two families live
there, while the unrecognized Palestinian village of Im-Tnan has over two
thousand residents.35 Although "agricultural villages" have long been
touted and endorsed by the Bedouin as a viable alternative to forced re-
settlement in government townships, not a single one has been built.3 6 Yet,
since the inception of the state, over one hundred agricultural villages for
Jewish farmers have been built in the Negev.37
The Bedouin population is extremely young, with 50 per cent of the
population under the age of fourteen and a staggering birthrate of 5.5 per
cent-as compared to 2 per cent among Negev Jews.38 When combined
with massive unemployment, these circumstances become a tremendous
social problem given that families need to invest more resources in child
rearing and education. Infant mortality rates among the Bedouin are the
highest in the country. In 2000, the birthrate was 14.7 deaths per thousand
live births, compared with 3.9 deaths per thousand live births among the
Israeli Jewish population.39 Furthermore, the age-adjusted general
mortality rate is approximately 50 per cent higher among Bedouin than
among Jews in the Negev4 Health services in the Negev have improved
somewhat over the past several years, in part because of judicial decisions
forcing government action." However, both the accessibility of health care
services and the quality of care available to Bedouin living in both the
33 AOF Statistics, supra note 9. It is difficult to determine the exact number of unrecognized
villages that exist in the Negev because it is unclear in some cases whether an entity constitutes a village
rather than a connected neighborhood.
See Maddrell, supra note 3 at 8.
35 HRA Factsheet, supra note 9.
36 Maddrell, supra note 3 at 15.
37See D. Izenberg, "High Court Asked to Legalize Negev Beduin Villages" Jerusalem Post (15
March 2000). See also infra note 190.
38 Center for Bedouin Studies and Development, Demographic and Health Information on Negev
Bedouin Arabs, online: <http://www.bgu.ac.il/bedouin/health-info.htm>.
3 9 No Man's Land, supra note 14 at 78.
4 0 Supra note 38.
41 Even where judicial decisions have forced Israeli authorities to improve Bedouin health care,
such decisions are often met with contempt by the government. For example, in 2001, the Israeli High
Court of Justice awarded NIS 20,000 to Adalah after the organization was forced to bring a contempt
proceeding against the Ministry of Health for failing to implement a court-sanctioned agreement to
build six mother-and-child care centers in unrecognized villages in the Negev.
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townships and the unrecognized villages remains grossly inadequate.42
The unavailability of resources has also created dramatic
educational challenges. The Bedouin education system is in a severe state
of crisis. According to a 2001 Human Rights Watch report detailing
discrimination against Palestinian Arab children in Israeli schools, the
organization concluded that Israel operates two wholly separate school
systems for Jewish children and Palestinian children, and that
"[d]iscrimination against Palestinian children colors every aspect of the two
systems. '43 Finding that Israel's schools for Palestinian children were
overcrowded, understaffed, poorly built, badly maintained, and often
altogether unavailable, the report points to many instances in which the
Bedouin are particularly disadvantaged and receive less funding and fewer
services than the rest of the Palestinian minority.'
The Bedouin education figures are startling. Approximately 60 per
cent of Bedouin students drop out of school before the twelfth grade, and
of those that complete high school, only a meagre 10 per cent pass their
Bagrut school matriculation exams.45 Only two out of every thousand
42 See No Man's Land, supra note 14 at 60-77 for a detailed discussion of the challenges faced by
the Bedouin with regard to obtaining primary health care services. Health care services for the Bedouin
have historically been assigned a low priority by the Israeli government, stemming in part from
discrimination and neglect. See also S. Shvarts, J. Borkan, M. Morad, & M. Sherf, "The Government
of Israel and the Health Care of the Negev Bedouin Under Military Government: 1948-1966" (2003)
47:1 Medical History 47.
43 Human Rights Watch, Second Class: Discrimination Against Palestinian Arab Children in Israel's
Schools, (September 2001) at 1 [Second Class]. In August 2004, Human Rights Watch wrote letters to,
among others, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon expressing deep concern that its recommendations
had not been heeded and that the 2005 Israeli budget fails to address "systematic discrimination against
Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel in the public education system." See Human Rights Watch, "Israel:
Budget Discriminates Against Children of Arab Citizens: Letter to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, (11
August 2004), online: <www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/08/11/isrlpa9225.htm>.
44 Second Class, ibid. at 22-23. See also Ismael Abu-Saad, "The Education System of Israel's Negev
Bedouin: Background and Prospects" 2 Isr. St. 2 (1997); Ismael Abu-Saad, "Education as a Tool for
Control vs. Development Among Indigenous Peoples: The Case of Bedouin Arabs in Israel" (2001) 2
Hagar Int. Social Sc. Rev. 241; U.S. Department of State, Israel and the Occupied Territories: Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2003 (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 25
February 2004) at 16 [State Department Report].
Center for Bedouin Studies and Development, Facts About Bedouin Arab Education in the
Negev, online: <http://www.bgu.ac.il/bedouin/education-lnkl.htm> [Education in the Negev]. On July
23, 2003, Adalah submitted a petition to the Israeli Supreme Court demanding that the Court order
the Ministry of Education to provide counselors pursuant to the Ministry's legal obligations under
Israeli law, noting that the seven Bedouin townships in the Negev have the highest drop-out rates in the
country and the lowest number of guidance counselors. H.C. 6671/03, MunjidAbu Ghanem, et aL v.
Ministry of Education, et al. (2003), case pending, online: <http://www.adalah.org/eng/
legaladvocacycultural.php#6671 >.
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Bedouin are university graduates. 46 Twenty-three per cent of the teaching
staff at Bedouin schools do not possess the required qualifications that are
mandatory throughout Israel.47 Many students travel long distances
(including round-trip journeys of two hundred kilometers and walks of five
kilometers in some cases) to attend schools that have too few classrooms,
little or no support staff, and poor facilities and infrastructure.48 In 1998,
"The Investigatory Committee on the Bedouin Education System in the
Negev," convened at the request of the former Minister of Education,
delivered a damning criticism of Bedouin schools in the Negev, stating:
"The State of Israel, which stands upon the principle of equal educational
opportunities of all, cannot ignore the severe crisis of the Bedouin
educational system today, and it should act immediately to correct the
injustices., 49 Since most Bedouin have little formal education, the
challenges of integrating into the labour force are greatly exacerbated."
III. CHARACTER, POLICY, AND COURTS
Evaluating whether Israel violates the Bedouin collective right to
adequate housing requires a careful consideration of both the overarching
legal character of the state and the legislative and policy choices that flow
from this character. In this part, I first examine the Zionist5' ideology that
shapes the Israeli polity, and discuss the implications of this ideology on the
democratic ideal of universal equality. I then examine how Israel's
46 Education in the Negev, ibid.
4 7 Ibid.
48 Ibid. See also Aliza Arbeli, "The Bedouin Kindergartens are Far From the Children in Order
to Concentrate the Dispersal" Ha'aretz (29 August 2001); and Cook, supra note 5 at 2, noting that
children in the unrecognized village of Abda must make a round trip of 87 miles per day to a
"recognized" area with a school.
49 Y. Katz et al., Report of the Investigatory Committee on the Bedouin Educational System in the
Negev, submitted to the Director General of the Ministry of Education, Ben Zion-Dal, (19 March 1998),
English excerpts online: <www.http://w3.bgu.ac.il/bedouin/katz-excerpts.htm> [Katz Report].
5 0 See Ben-Tal, supra note 24. Ben-Tal interviews Dr. Ismael Abu-Saad, former Director of the
Center for Bedouin Studies and Development at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, and chronicles
the dismal failures of the Bedouin education system and the resultant inability of Bedouin citizens to
compete in a "high-tech society." See also Ismael Abu-Saad, "Bedouin Arab Education in the Context
of Radical Social Change: What is the Future?" (1999) 25 Compare 2 at 149-60.
51 Zionism is a modem political movement born in Europe in the late-1800s. The common goal
of all political Zionists is the establishment and continued existence of a Jewish state in historic
Palestine, based on the historic right of the Jewish people, accessible as a national homeland to Jewish
communities throughout the world. For a comprehensive anthology of works by influential Zionists,
see Arthur Hertzberg, ed., The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1970); see also David Vital, The Origins of Zionism (Oxford: University Press, 1980).
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"national character" has been translated into a series of legislative and
policy choices that violate the Bedouin right to adequate housing. Finally,
I review the manner in which Bedouin litigants and their land claims have
been treated by the Israeli judicial system.
A. The Discriminatory Character of the Israeli State
1. The Absence of Formal Equality
Zionism is the guiding political philosophy of the Israeli state.5"
From a governmental policy perspective, Zionism manifests itself in two
particular ways. First, it occurs in the absence of formal equality for a sector
of the population (Palestinian citizens), such that a distinct segment of the
population (Jewish citizens) are given preferred status. Second, it is
manifested in Israel's administration of the state through institutions that
cater only to the Jewish population.
The inherent tension between Zionist ideology and democratic
values is apparent in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of
Israel (1948). 4 The Declaration defines Israel as both a Jewish state,
committed to the "ingathering of the exiles," and a democratic one,
guaranteeing equality to all its citizens. The first statement defines the
national character of the state as privileging one group, namely, the Jewish
people, and the second statement stresses universal democratic values.
Arguably, the inherently Jewish foundations of the state necessarily
compromise the enjoyment of equality for the Arab minority. As the
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights noted
in its 2003 Concluding Observations on Israel, "The Committee reiterates
its concern that the excessive emphasis upon the State as a 'Jewish State'
encourages discrimination and accords a second-class status to its non-
Jewish citizens.,
55
52 For a detailed discussion of the role of Zionist ideology in shaping Israeli approaches to the
Arab population and the development of the Israeli land regime, see George E. Bisharat, "Land, Law
and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied Territories" (1993-1994) 43 Am. U. L. Rev. 467 at 474-91;
Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, "The Legal Transformation of Ethnic Geography: Israeli Law and the
Palestinian Landholder 1948-1967" (2000-2001) 33 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 923 at 939-49; and Access
Denied, supra note 1.
53 See also Kretzmer, supra note 1 at 49-69; and Access Denied, supra note 1 at 143-66.
54 Official Gazette, no. 1, 14 May 1948 [the Declaration]. See alsoAdalah's Report, supra note 26
at 1; and Access Denied, supra note 1 at 19.
55 Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Israel,
30th Session, 5 - 23 May 2003, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.90 at para. 16.
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The contradiction between these two values has been ignored by
most Israeli legal scholars. 6 Where it has been challenged, the famous
response offered by former Israeli Chief Justice Shamgar is generally
echoed: "[T]he existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish
people does not deny its democratic nature, just as the Frenchness of
France does not deny its democratic nature."57
Despite the offering of such rhetoric by many Israeli scholars as an
adequate resolution of this contradiction, others argue that Israel cannot
maintain itself as both a Jewish state and a democratic one (democratic in
the sense that it provides for equality amongst all citizens and not merely
that it allows them to vote). 8 This point is expressed by Noam Chomsky,
who states:
The Zionist dream is to construct a state that is as Jewish as England is English and France
is French. At the same time, this state is to be a democracy on the Western model. Evidently,
these goals are incompatible. Citizens of France are French, but citizens of the Jewish state
may be non-Jews, either by ethnic or religious origin, or simply by choice .... To the extent
that Israel is a Jewish state it cannot be a democratic state.5 9
Thus, as quickly as the principle of equality became an element of
the Israeli state via its founding Declaration, it simultaneously became
neutralized by its Jewish characterization. While Israel's legal system has
gained much international respect for its progressive rulings on equal rights
for disadvantaged groups such as homosexuals' and women,6" there is no
constitutional provision or legislation that provides for the right to equality
for all citizens.
Although Israel lacks a formal written constitution or bill of rights,
the passage of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom (1992),62 was
heralded by many as a quasi-bill of rights, which legislated the protection
of civil liberties and basic human rights. This law offers the right to "dignity,
5 6 Adalah's Report, supra note 26 at 8.
57 Ibid.
58 See e.g. Oren Yiftachel, "'Ethnocracy' and Geography: Territory and Politics in
Israel/Palestine," online: <http://www.bgu.ac.il/geog/members/yiftachel/paper3.html> ['Ethnocracy'
and Geography]; and Oren Yiftachel, "Ethnocracy: the Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine" (2000) 6:3
Constellations 364-90 [Ethnocracy and Politics]. See also text accompanying note 74, below.
59 In Jiryis, supra note 1 at xi. See generally Access Denied, supra note 1 at 19-22.
60 See HCJ 721/94 El-AlAirlines v. Danielowitz [1992-4] Isr. L .R. 478.
61 See Miller v. The Minister of Defense, unpublished decision delivered 11 August 1995; H.C.
453/94 Israel Women's Network v. The Government of Israel, 48(5) P.D. 501.
62 1391 L.S.I. 150. The full English text of the Basic Law and its 1994 amendment are available
online: <http://www.knesset.gov.il> [Basic Law].
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life, freedom, privacy, property, and the right to leave and enter the
country," but contains no provision for equality.63 On the contrary, the
Basic Law reaffirms the Jewish character of the state in Provision 1(a),
which states: "The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity
and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of
Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. ' 64
Israel's 1998 report to the United Nations Committee on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 65 emphasized
that the Basic Law did contain the principle of equality by interpretation,
but the Supreme Court of Israel has never directly adopted an
interpretation of the Basic Law (or any other legislation) that included the
right to equality. In April 2000, the Supreme Court of Israel issued its
decision in the Qa'dan case, holding that the state is prohibited from using
"national institutions" to perform discriminatory acts on its behalf.66 The
case involved a petition by the Qa'dan family challenging the Israel Lands
Administration (ILA), 67 the Jewish Agency, and the Katzir Cooperative
Association's refusal to allow the Qa'dans to purchase a home in Katzir on
the grounds that the community accepted only Jews as residents.
61
Restricting itself to the specific facts of the case, the Court held that direct
or indirect state discrimination on the basis of nationality was prohibited,
and that the state could not absolve itself of its duty to not discriminate by
allocating land to institutions that then use the land discriminatorily.
69
63 A 1994 amendment to the Basic Law states that the principles enunciated in the Declaration of
the Establishment of the State of Israel are part of the values protected by the Basic Law. However, this
returns us to the starting point of our discussion, where courts must consistently reconcile the tension
between a Jewish state and a democratic one in favour of its essentially Jewish character.
64Adalah's Report, supra note 26 at 8.
65 See CERD/C/294/Add.1. CERD delivered its Concluding Observations at its 52nd session, 19
March 1998 (CERD/C/52 Misc. 29) [Concluding Observations].
66 H.C. 6698/95. Qa'dan v. Israeli Lands Administration et al., 54(1) P.D. 258.
6 7 The ILA is a governmental body created pursuant to the IsraelLandsAdministration Law (1960)
and is charged with the administration of state land.
68 Katzir is a Jewish settlement established by the Jewish Agency.
69 Beyond land planning policy, the decision of the Supreme Court of Israel in Adalah et al. v.
Minister of Religious Affairs et al., P.D. 54 (2) 164 (2000), was a precedent-setting decision on equality
rights [Minister of Religious Affairs]. In that case, Adalah challenged the constitutionality of two articles
of the 1999 Budget Law, allocating funding exclusively to Jewish cemeteries. Adalah's petition argued
that the Ministry of Religious Affairs must set clear, non-discriminatory criteria for the allocation of
public resources to all cemeteries, including Arab Muslim, Christian, or Druze cemeteries. The Court,
noting the Ministry's failure to offer any justification for the unequal distribution of these resources,
held that "The resources of the State, whether land or money ... belong to all citizens and all citizens
are entitled to enjoy them according to the principle of equality, without discrimination, based on
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Heralded as a highly progressive verdict by many Israeli legal
scholars, the Qa'dan decision received a remarkably different response
within the Palestinian legal community in Israel.7 ° Many critics of the
decision noted that the Court did not provide the relief requested-an
order allowing the Qa'dan family to purchase a home in Katzir. The
decision also did not explicitly provide that Jewish settlements could not
discriminate against Arabs or provide a broader endorsement of racial
equality, but merely prevented the transfer of state property specifically for
that purpose. To many Palestinian citizens, the decision suggested a legal
program of integration and assimilation rather than equality.7'
Furthermore, the Court adopted a forward-looking approach in its decision
that negates and obscures the painful history of land appropriation and
unfair allocation. Additionally, the Court noted that discrimination
between Jews and non-Jews may be acceptable under "special
circumstances," leaving the government with the discretion to determine
when and where such circumstances may exist. Thus, while the Qa'dan
decision may be a catalyst to broader judicial interpretations regarding
equality, only explicit statutory or constitutional guarantees of equality can
be meaningfully viewed as providing the right to equality for all Israeli
citizens.72
The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, Cultural
Rights recently had the opportunity to address the absence of formal
equality in Israel and stated:
religion, race, sex or other prohibited consideration."
70 See Ronen Shamir, "Zionism 2000: Past, Future, and the Qa'dan Family" (2000) 2 Adalah's
Rev. 27; Ruth Gavison, "Jewish and Democratic" (2000) 2 Adalah's Rev. 32; and Marwan Dalai, "The
Guest, the House, and the Judge" (2000) 2 Adalah's Rev. 44. See also Jamil Dakwar, "Qa'dan: to what
extent an achievement?" Ha 'aretz (15 March 2000); and Hassan Rafiq Jabareen, "On the Oppression
of Identities in the Name of Civil Equality" (1999) 1 Adalah's Rev. In this article, Jabareen argues that
true equality would not be fostered simply by the integration of Palestinians into Jewish (rather than
"Israeli") institutions that embody the Jewish character of the state. Jabareen explains that unlike
oppressed minorities in many other countries, Palestinians cannot equally be integrated into a state
whose defining characteristics are grounded in ethnic and religious rather than civil identity.
Jabareen, ibid.
72 SeeAccess Denied, supra note 1 at 54-57. The limited utility of judicial decisions in guaranteeing
equality is exemplified by the fact that the Qa'dan family was finally allowed to purchase a plot of land
in Katzir in May 2004, only after a second petition was filed by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel
(ACRI), aimed at curbing protracted efforts by state agencies to prevent the Qa'dans from purchasing
a plot of land in Katzir. See ACRI's website, online: <http://www.acri.org.il/english-acri/
engine/story.asp?id = 177>. Similarly, in Minister of Religious Affairs, supra note 69, Adalah was forced
to file another motion demanding that the Ministry of Religious Affairs comply with the Court's ruling
in preparing its 2001 budget.
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The Committee is deeply concerned about the continuing difference in treatment between
Jews and non-Jews, in particular Arab and Bedouin communities, with regard to their
enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights in the State party's territory ... . This
discriminatory attitude is apparent in the continued lower standard of living of Israeli Arabs
as a result, inter alia, of higher unemployment rates, restricted access to and participation in
trade unions, lack of access to housing, water, electricity, health care, and a lower level of
education, despite the State party's efforts to close the gap. In this regard, the Committee
expresses its concern that the State party's domestic legal order does not enshrine the general
principles of equality and non-discrimination.73
2. True Democracy or "Settling Ethnocracy"?
Israeli political geographer Oren Yiftachel argues that the assumed
classification of Israel as a democratic state is illusory. Instead, he argues
that Israel is a "settling ethnocracy," where ethnicity rather than territorial
citizenship drives the allocation of resources.7 4 Noting that ethnic (or
Jewish-based) settlement initiatives have been a central ideological and
practical element of the Israeli polity from its origination, Yiftachel posits
that one ethnic group enjoys a superior status thereby appropriating the
Israeli political apparatus and dictating the nature of its public policies.75
Israeli legal scholar Alexandre Kedar, discussing Yiftachel's work,
notes that settler societies typically pursue a deliberate strategy geared
towards altering a country's demographic and ethnic structure. Thus, Kedar
argues that the Israeli legal system, in the first two decades after the
creation of the state, began "transforming land possession rules in ways that
undermined the possibilities of Arab landholders to maintain their
possession, [and] brought about the transference and registration of
ownership of this land to the Jewish state.,
7 6
Challenging many Israeli scholars who have argued for the
compatibility of a stable democratic system with a state whose primary
political vision requires preferential treatment for one ethnic group,
Yiftachel argues that "the illusion of democracy has given internal and
international legitimacy to Israel's expansionist practices and policies, and
Supra note 55 at para.16. Similarly, the State Department Report, supra note 44, states:
The Government [of Israel] did little [in 2003] to reduce institutional, legal, and societal
discrimination against the country's Arab citizens, who constituted approximately 20 percent
of the population but did not share fully the rights and benefits provided to, and obligations
imposed on, the country's Jewish citizens.
'Ethnocracy'and Geography, supra note 58. See also Ethnocracy and Politics, supra note 58.
Oren Yiftachel, "Nation Building and the Division of Space: Frontiers and Domination in the
Israeli 'Ethnocracy,"' online: <http://www.bgu.ac.il/geog/members/yiftachel/paper2.html>.
76 Kedar, supra note 52 at 924.
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helped foster and preserve a system of unequal citizenship."77 Yiftachel
points to many examples of statements by Israeli politicians and scholars
that betray a vision of the state's interests as so deeply intertwined with the
Zionist settlement project that they necessarily conceptualize Palestinian
citizens as an alien presence within an ethnocratically defined state.78 For
example, Yiftachel notes the views expressed by the leader of the National
Religious Party, former cabinet member Efraim Eitam:
Jordan and Sinai are, in the final analysis, the territorial address for meeting the national
aspirations of the Palestinians. Israel should control forever the entire territory between
Jordan and the sea. We should offer the Palestinians a choice between enlightened residency
(with no voting rights) in Israel, or primitive Arab citizenship. The Arabs in Israel are a
ticking time-bomb .... They resemble a cancerous growth. We shall have to consider the
ability of the Israeli democracy to continue the Arabs' participation.
79
Exploring the roots of this dynamic, Kedar argues that three
fundamental assumptions characterized the Zionist approach to land near
the end of the British Mandate period,8 ° each of which can be viewed as
critical to the development of the Israeli land regime over the past half-
century: "(1) land belongs to the collective and not to individuals; (2) this
collective has a special connection (symbolic, at least) to the Jewish people
as a whole; and (3) this collective does not include all inhabitants of
Palestine, but rather Jews alone.""
The ethnocratic orientation of the state, such that its institutions
and laws are grounded in the Jewish character of the state, is likely at the
root of racist attitudes towards the Palestinian minority in Israel. As Adalah
explained in its Report to the World Conference Against Racism in
Durban, South Africa:
It is important, then, to approach racism directed at the Palestinian community as a distinct
form of racism in Israel. Its distinctiveness is reinforced by Israel's self-vision of isolation in
a region of enemy Arab states, a vision that is axiomatic to the dominant public discourse in
Israel. This view is constructed in part by Israel's geographic circumstance, forged through
the displacement of the native Palestinian population, and its historical circumstance,
characterized by a series of military confrontations with neighboring Arab countries, both
leading up to the establishment of the state in 1948 and in the decades since then. The fact
that Palestinian citizens of Israel belong to the "Arab nation," considered an enemy of Israel,
77Oren Yiftachel, "The Shrinking Space of Citizenship: Ethnocratic Politics in Israel," online:
Middle East Report <http:/www.merip.org/mer/mer223/223jiftachel.html> at para. 11.
78 Ibid.
7 9 Ibid. at para. 25.
80 The British Mandate (i.e. British rule of Palestine) period lasted from 1917 to 1948.
81 Kedar, supra note 52 at 943. See also Bisharat, supra note 52 at 475-91.
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significantly adds to the racist attitudes held and sentiments expressed against them. The
harshly demarcated lines of "us" versus "them" play a prominent role in the national
consciousness of the Jewish majority in Israel. These divisions, which help constitute the
national mythology, are routinely reinforced through institutionalized differentiation
between Palestinian and Jewish citizens in Israel.
8 2
3. Institutionalized Discrimination
Zionism sets the political policy agenda in Israel through the
operation and constitutions of three principal organizations: The World
Zionist Organization (wzo), the Jewish Agency (JA), and the Jewish
National Fund (JNF). These organizations functioned as the leadership of
the Zionist movement before the creation of Israel. After Israel came into
being, they were given quasi-governmental status and deal with the
acquisition of land, the provision of funding for land purchases, and the
general development of the state.83
All undertakings by these organizations are conducted on behalf
of Jews only. The Knesset (Israeli parliament) has enacted countless laws
that transfer state land to the JA or the JNF, while making no explicit
provisions about how that land is to be distributed. Moreover, Israel
systematically delegates the administration of countless programs and
projects to these organizations, with the knowledge that they are bound by
their own constitutions and regulations to use any allocated funds
exclusively for Jewish benefit.84 The influence and practical involvement of
8 2 Adalah's Report, supra note 26 at 1.
83 Seethe World Zionist Organization-Jewish Agency (Status) Law (1952) (wzoLaw) and the Jewish
National Fund Law (1953). For a detailed discussion of the history, circumstances, and operation of
these laws, seeAccess Denied, supra note 1 at 143-97; Uri Davis,Apartheid Israel: Possibilities for Struggle
Within (London: Zed Books, 2003) at 7-59; and Walter Lehn & Uri Davis, The Jewish National Fund
(London: Kegan Paul, 1988).
84 Article 3(d) and (e) of the Constitution of the Jewish Agency states:
Land is to be acquired as Jewish property and ... the title of the lands acquired is to be taken
in the name of the JNF to the end that the same shall be held as the inalienable property of
the Jewish people. The Agency shall promote agricultural colonization based on Jewish
labour, and in all works or undertakings carried our or furthered by the Agency, it shall be
deemed to be a matter of principle that Jewish labour shall be employed.
Article 3(a) of the iNF's Memorandum of Association states its primary object as:
To purchase, acquire or lease or in exchange, etc ... in the prescribed region (which
expression in this Memorandum shall mean the State of Israel in any area within the
jurisdiction of the Government of Israel or any part thereof, for the purpose of settling Jews
on such lands and properties.
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the JA and the JNF in executing Israeli governmental policy is the primary
mechanism for effecting institutionalized discrimination in Israel." These
organizations make the discriminatory character of the Israeli state invisible
to the outside observer, and allow Israel to claim to be the "only democracy
in the Middle East.,
86
Israeli human rights activist and political writer Uri Davis has more
radically argued that Israel should be considered an apartheid state.87 Davis
points out that while racism is prevalent in all states, including Western
liberal democracies, Israel can best be characterized as an apartheid state
insofar as racism is regulated in law through legislative action and the legal
system, affording Arab citizens a second-class status while forcing "the
citizenry through acts of parliament to make racist choices and conform to
racist behaviour.,
88
While neither the wzo Law nor many of the other laws passed to
perpetuate this system draw explicit distinctions between "Jews" and "non-
Jews,, 89 their vesting of authority over settlement and land development
with organizations constitutionally bound to act only in the interests of Jews
fosters institutionalized discrimination.90 By incorporating the exclusivist
provisions of these organizations into the Israeli legal system, Davis argues
that this legislative structure functions to preserve the "veil of ambiguity
over Israeli apartheid legislation for over half a century.
''0 1
In Davis, supra note 83 at 40. For a detailed discussion, see alsoAccess Denied, supra note 1 at 143-
94; and Lehn & Davis, ibid., at 186-91. Chapter 6 of Lehn & Davis's book, entitled "Only to Jews,"
discusses the mechanisms through which these agencies operate only for the benefit of Jewish citizens
in a non-explicit fashion.
85 Davis, supra note 83 at 55-56. The impact of the Qa'dan decision on the ability of the JNF and
JA to continue to engage in discriminatory land allocations remains to be seen.
86Access Denied, supra note 1 at 143-66. Davis, supra note 83 at 37-38.
87 Davis, supra note 83.
88 Ibid. at 37. Israeli scholars and politicians argue that Israel can hardly be considered an
apartheid state given that Arab citizens are entitled to vote, Arab citizens are Members of the Knesset,
and Arab citizens (in principle) have equal standing before the courts. Davis argues that the availability
of these rights serves only to obscure the fact Israel maintains a political program aimed at legislatively
depriving Arab citizens of equal access to and enjoyment of the material allocations of the state (i.e.
second-class citizenship).
8 9 Ibid. at 43-44.
9 0 Ibid. at 41-44.
91 Ibid. at 39. Institutionalized discrimination has not prevented the existence of some overtly
discriminatory legislation. For example, recent controversy and international condemnation has been
sparked by the Nationality and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Order) (2003). This law prohibits the
granting of residency or citizenship status to Palestinians from the Occupied Territories who are
married to Israeli citizens, thereby banning family unification. See Adalah's website for detailed
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The land planning policies crafted to facilitate the expropriation of
Bedouin land and their forced transfer to the townships, merits an analysis
as to whether Israel can be viewed as a committing the crime of apartheid
against its Bedouin citizens. Article 2(c) of the International Convention on
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid applies the term
"the crime of apartheid" to:
Any legislative measures and other measures calculated to prevent a racial group from
participation in the political, social, economic, and cultural life of the country and the
deliberate creation of conditions preventing the full development of such a group .... '
While Israel is not a party to the Apartheid Convention and is,
therefore, not bound by its terms, it remains an informative tool in
deciphering which state actions can be viewed as crimes of apartheid
according to international law. Given that the government-sanctioned
institutional structure, pursuant to the wzo Law, mandates the allocation
of agricultural land and resources in the Negev solely for the benefit of
Jewish citizens, "legislative measures" aimed at forcibly evicting the
Bedouin from their ancestoral lands to facilitate such discriminatory
purposes prevent the Bedouin from meaningful participation in the
"political, social, economic, and cultural life of the country." Moreover,
insofar as the "full development" of Bedouin society remains intrinsically
connected with agrarian pursuits, Israel's sedentarization policy, reviewed
below, may well fulfill the criteria specified in Article 2(c) of the Apartheid
Convention and constitute a crime of apartheid.
B. Discriminatory Legislation and Policy
Although Israel has enjoyed virtually unchecked power to control
the Arab minority under its authority, it has generally resorted to a complex
set of legal apparatus for achieving its land expropriation goals. These legal
tools have served to undermine the ability of Bedouin landholders to retain
land possession through the application of formalistic legal requirements
while at the same time facilitating the mass transfer of land to the state.93
In an article on the use of law in legitimating Israel's land regime, George
Bisharat argues that, like many colonial powers, Israel has used legalism
information, online: <http://www.adalah.org/eng/famunif.php>. See also Adalah's Report, supra note
26 at 83-84, highlighting other directly and indirectly discriminatory laws.
92 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, G.A.
Res. 3068 (XXVII), 28 UN GAOR, Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974) [Apartheid Convention].
93 Kedar, supra note 52 at 924.
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rather than raw power as a strategy for the appropriation of land "to
rationalize and defend acquisition of Arab lands for two principal
audiences: the Israeli public itself, and secondarily, the international
community." 94
1. Empty Space and Rootless Nomads
The Israeli justification for concentrating the Bedouin in urban
townships is fueled by a view of the Negev as "empty space." 95 Flyers,
pamphlets, and advertisements encourage active settlement in the Negev,
boasting of the abundance of available agricultural land under the slogan
"Making a Desert Bloom." s Political Zionism has characterized itself as a
Western civilizing force, standing in opposition to the "tribalistic and
backwards" ways of the Bedouin. The Bedouin are generally regarded as
rootless nomads and classified as a natural element on the land, rather than
as a civilized population that has settled on it.97 This orientalist view of the
Bedouin as "other" culminates in the convergence of the two ideas
mentioned above: "One aspect of this official story emphasizes the empty
quality of the Negev, while another aspect discovers the Bedouin nomads
as a part of nature. Both aspects ultimately converge into a single
trajectory: an empty space that awaits Jewish liberation, and a nomadic
culture that awaits civilization.,
98
Hence, there is a cultural conception of the Bedouin as an archaic,
nomadic society that is dying and which must be saved by Western
civilization. The Bedouin are viewed as an unsettled population, and their
settlements labeled as "spontaneous" rather than "planned." This cultural
dichotomy can be extended into the legal realm, where such
94 Bisharat, supra note 52 at 468. In arguing that the use of law by colonial enterprises is directed
at legitimating state actions for the dominant classes and the international community, Bisharat
challenges what he considers the false assumption that the use of law by a colonial power functions to
legitimate state actions to the oppressed groups or classes in order to foster implicit consent to such
domination and oppression.
95 Shamir, supra note 30. See also M. Friedman, "If Young People Don't Do It, No One Will" The
Jerusalem Report (29 December 2003) 60, discussing former Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's call
to Jews to settle the Negev.
96 Falah, supra note 6 at 35.
97 Shamir, supra note 30 at 237. See also Falah, supra note 19 at 73, providing a review of the
factors that typically lead governments to adopt policies aimed at sedentarizing pastoral nomadic
communities.
98 Shamir, ibid. at 236. For the landmark analysis of orientalism and its effect on shaping
conceptions of Arabs and the Middle East, see Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books,
1979).
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conceptualizations obscure Bedouin claims to historic land ownership and
only recognize formal land registrations, making the Bedouin worldview
appear incompatible with any modern conception of land ownership.' Such
thinking, has by extension fostered a view of Bedouin as trespassers and
intruders in their own homes.
Thus, Israel sees itself as fulfilling the promise of Westernization by
transforming an ancient culture and forcing it into a structured pattern of
urban development.l"0 However, the Israeli characterization of the Bedouin
as nomadic peoples unattached to specific plots of land is false. Unlike
many other Middle Eastern nomadic communities, the Negev Bedouin had
already ceased living nomadically long before the Israeli government began
its settlement program. 10 1 Accordingly, as noted by Ghazi Falah, "these
[settlement programs] were not aimed primarily at settling a highly mobile
population; rather, the objective was to evict this population from its lands
and to resettle it elsewhere.
10 2
Ottoman records of land disputes within the Negev Bedouin
community indicate that specific tribes valued their land ownership claims
enough to go to war over them.10 3 Historically, Bedouins who could not lay
claim to land were relegated to an inferior status.10 4 The Bedouin had, and
in many cases continue to have, their own sophisticated methods for
resolving land ownership disputes. 10 5 Most Bedouin had permanent places
of residence and moved only seasonally for grazing. 106 The ownership of
pastoral land was fixed in most cases. 10 7 In fact, by 1948 the Bedouin were
semi-nomadic in that most had a permanent dwelling place and many had
99 Shamir, ibid. at 237.
100 See Oren Yiftachel, "Planning and Social Control: Exploring the Dark Side" (1998) 12 J. Plan.
Lit. 2 at 395. In this article, Yiftachel develops a critical theory of urban and regional planning. He
argues that most accounts of urban and regional planning assume that such endeavours are progressive
and ignore the frequent use of planning as an oppressive instrument aimed at exerting social control
over marginalized groups.
101 See Access Denied, supra note 1 at 112-13.
102 Falah, supra note 19 at 72.
103 Maddrell, supra note 3 at 5.
104 Ibid.
105 Shamir, supra note 30 at 235. See alsoAccess Denied, supra note 1 at 112-13.
106 See Access Denied, ibid.
107 Maddrell points out that according to a 1931 census 89.3 per cent of the Bedouin were
dependant on agriculture while only 10.7 per cent earned a living from raising livestock, suggesting a
transition from traditional nomadic pastoralism to settled farming. Supra note 3 at 5. See also Falah,
supra note 8 at 36.
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built stone houses. 10 8 A British Colonial officer in 1937 wrote:
Too much weight must not be attached to the romantic associations with the word "Bedouin"
and the sentimental conceptions aroused by the conception of the "noble nomad." The
Bedouin of the Beersheba area are semi-pastoral and semi-agricultural. They dwell in tents
but are not true wanderers of the desert and otherwise differ little from many fellahin
[peasants] who live in stone houses but are seasonal migrants."09
Thus, despite the cultural conceptualization described above, it is
not sufficient to suggest that Israel is singularly motivated by the cultural
values of an industrialized society. While this worldview is the pretense for
publicly celebrating the Bedouin transfer, it is not the state's prime
motivation. The underlying motivation is that there is simply no room for
a traditional agrarian community on land earmarked for the exclusive
agricultural and settlement pursuits of the most advantaged sector of Israeli
society, namely the Jewish population. t0 As Israel's first Prime Minister,
David Ben-Gurion, wrote to his son as early as 1937: "Negev land is
reserved for Jewish citizens whenever and wherever they want. We must
expel the Arabs and take their place." ' More recently, the former Israeli
cabinet minister responsible for land management, Avigdor Lieberman,
made the following statement regarding Bedouin attempts to resist Israel's
sedentarization policies: "We must stop their illegal invasion of state land
by all means possible. The Bedouins have no regard for our laws; in the
process we are losing the last resources of state lands. One of my main
missions is to return the power of the Land Authority in dealing with the
non-Jewish threat to our lands." 112 Lieberman's use of the terms "we,"
"their," and "our" highlights the frequent tendency of Israeli government
officials to characterize Bedouin citizens as an alien presence on the land,
suggesting that only Jewish citizens are viewed as the true owners of state
108 Maddrell, supra note 3.
109 CO 733/348/11, Public Record Office, Kew. Cited in Maddrell, supra note 3 at 5.
110 See Maddrell, supra note 3 at 9. See also Rachel Pomerance, "Pioneering Israelis settle the
Negev in quest to create a Jewish majority" Global News Service of the Jewish People, (5 October 2003)
online: JTA News <http://www.jta.org/page-view story.asp?intarticleid=13282&intcategoryid=l>.
III Quoted in Cook, supra note 5 at 1. See Mitchell Ginsburg, "A Bedouin Powder Keg in the
Negev" The Jerusalem Post (8 September 2003). Referring to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's five-year
plan for the Negev, Ginsburg notes "Over the next five years, the government intends to encourage -
and, if necessary, force - 70,000 Negev Beduin to leave their sprawling shantytowns for new, urban
communities, and thus to free up space for Jewish building."
112 Supra note 77 at para. 1 [emphasis added].
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land. "'13
In many cases, the racist and discriminatory underpinnings of Israeli
governmental policy towards the Bedouin have been expressed in even
clearer terms. For example, in July 2001, the head of the Ministry of
Education's Bedouin education system, Moshe Shohat, stated:
Bedouin are a bloodthirsty people who commit polygamy, have 30 children, and continue to
expand their illegal settlements by taking over state lands. In their culture, they relieve
themselves outdoors and don't even know how to use the toilet."
4
From an official Israeli perspective, the motives behind Bedouin
sedentarization are benevolent. While the original reasons given for
concentrating the Bedouin were based on military security considerations,
the justifications for transferring the Bedouin population into the townships
have evolved into more sensitive language.115 The modern justifications for
transfer are to prevent the spread of "spontaneously" erected settlements
and to ensure the provision of basic services." 6
Sedentarization of the Bedouin is not simply the inadvertent effect
of Israeli policy, but that it actually is the Israeli policy. As early as 1959, the
government announced that a major aim within its Bedouin policy was "the
passage of a law for the settlement of the Bedouin and their transfer to
permanent homes in the Negev..". 7 Israeli legislation and the activities of
units like the Green Patrol (discussed below) demonstrate non-benevolent
motives. Bedouin settlement activity, such as "spontaneous" building in the
1 13 In January 2004, referring to and offering a justification for the practice of toxic crop spraying
of unrecognized villages, Israel Lands Administration spokesperson Ortal Tzabar stated: "We did what
we had to do because it is our land. The Bedouin invaded the land and planted crops illegally with no
permits. It wasn't their land. The action was to stop this invasion in a less violent way" [emphasis added],
cited in H.L. Krieger, "Bedouin Outraged by Crop Spraying" Jerusalem Post (29 January 2004). Note
again the usage of the terms "we," "their," and "invasion" as illustrative of the perception that Bedouin
do not share the entitlement to state land that should presumably be an equal benefit available to all
Israeli citizens.
114 Cited in "High Court Asks Why Bedouin Education System Chief Not Fired" Jerusalem Post
(16 January 2002). See also Robbie Berman, "Israeli Official Slurs Bedouins" Jewish Week (20 July
2001).
115 Kurt Goering, "Israel and the Bedouin of the Negev" (1979) 9 J. Palestine Stud. 3 at 6.
11 6 InAvitan v. Israel LandAuthority, H.C.J. 528/88 (1988) P.D. 43(4), 297 [Avitan], the Supreme
Court of Israel effectively legitimized the state's resettlement program as a type of affirmative action
program, providing a precedent under which the Israeli government is free to ignore the Bedouin desire
to maintain an agrarian lifestyle.
117 Israel, Knesset Debates (5 August 1959) at 2923, cited in Jiryis, supra note 1 at 103. See
especially, Adalah, News Release, "Adalah to PM Sharon: The Government's Five-Year Plan for the
Arab Bedouin in the Naqab is Discriminatory and Illegal" (8 May 2003), online:
<http://www.adalah.org/eng/pressreleases/pr.php?file=03_05 08> [Adalah Press Release].
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unrecognized villages, has been negatively viewed as encroaching on state
land designated for Jewish settlement, and seen as a method by which the
Bedouin hope to demand land rights and compensation. 118 The Negev
represents a great mass of land available for future settlement and is prized
for that reason above all others." 9 Shai Hermesh, the treasurer of the JA
and the head of its alleged effort to ensure a Zionist majority in the Negev,
commented, "We need the Negev for the next generation of Jewish
immigrants. In the Negev you can get land for pennies ... . It is not in
Israel's interest to have more Palestinians in the Negev.
'2120
Thus, while the official purpose for maintaining the military
enclosure area discussed above was security, the real reasons involved
ensuring an adequate supply of jobs for new Jewish immigrants, preventing
Bedouin from returning to their land, preventing the formation of political
organizations and collective uprising, and most importantly, state
appropriation of Bedouin land. 121 In truth, Israel's program of "merciful
urbanization" is merely the philanthropic pretense under which land can be
expropriated without eliciting widespread internal and external criticism.
In 1963, Moshe Dayan, then Minister of Defence, made the following
revealing remark regarding governmental objectives for the Bedouin
community:
We should transform the Bedouin into an urban proletariat in industry, services,
construction, and agriculture. Eighty-eight percent of the Israeli population are not farmers,
let the Bedouin be like them. Indeed, this will be a radical move which means that the
Bedouin would not live on his land with his herds, but would become an urban person who
comes home in the afternoon and puts his slippers on .... The children would go to school
with their hair properly combed. This would be a revolution, but it would be fixed within two
generations. Without coercion but with government direction ... this phenomenon of the
Bedouins will disappear.1 2
118 Falah, supra note 19 at 77. Falah refers to the work of Israeli scholars on the Bedouin, and
shows how the Bedouin are characterized as insidiously plotting against the state. Israeli politicians have
often been very frank in making such characterizations. Government Minister Effi Eitam recently
referred to the Bedouin as waging a "construction jihad" against the Israeli state, and Public Security
Minister Tzachi Hanegbi was recently quoted as telling Jews in the Negev to "Rise up in your thousands,
take up sticks and get rid of the Bedouin Arabs," cited in Jonathan Cook, "Sharon Stokes Fears Of Arab
Minority to Serve His Long Term Interests" The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (October
2003).
119 Falah, supra note 19 at 77.
120 Cited in Chris McGreal, "Bedouin Feel the Squeeze as Israel Resettles the Negev: Thousands
Displaced from Ancient Homeland" The Guardian (27 February 2003).
121 Maddrell, supra note 3 at 7. See especially, Jiryis, supra note 1 at 102-30.
122, M. Dayan on Land Policy and the Problems of the Bedouins in Israel" Ha'aretz (31 July 1963)
(English translation), reprinted in Shamir, supra note 30 at 231.
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2. Legislating Land Expropriation
This section discusses the manner in which Israel, since its inception
in 1948, has developed a legislative canon that effectively makes Bedouin
(and Palestinian generally) land claims invisible. This process has been
achieved through a series of notorious and potent laws.
The first is the Absentee's Property Law, 1950.123 This law allowed
the state to acquire real property left behind by those who were expelled or
fled their homes during the 1948 war.124 The absentee status does not
change should the person re-enter the country or even if the person
remains in the country-these people became known as "present
absentees. ', 125 This law began a process of expropriating land from private
Palestinian owners and systematically distributing such land to Jewish
ownership, through a variety of institutional mechanisms.126 Estimates by
the Israeli Custodian of Absentee Property and the JNF suggest that
between 70-88 per cent of Israeli territory consists of land classified as
"absentee property.' ' 27
The Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts & Compensation) Law
(1953)' 28 stated that land not in the possession of its owner as of April 1,
1952, could be registered as state property. 129 Since the Bedouin had been
transferred into the enclosure zone by this point in time, this law facilitated
the massive transfer of Negev lands to the state.13° All lands in the western
Negev from which the Bedouin had been removed were declared
123 4 L.S.I. 68. For a detailed discussion of the Absentee Property Law and its broad implications
for Palestinian citizens of Israel as well as Palestinian refugees around the world, see Bisharat, supra
note 52 at 513-14; Access Denied, supra note 1 at 69-76.
124 Access Denied, ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 The ILA administers all public land in Israel and has a legal obligation not to discriminate
against citizens. However, 50 per cent of the governing council of the ILA is comprised of members of
the Jewish National Fund. The ILA has frequently transferred public land to the JNF, which by its
constitution, can only allocate such land for use by Jews.
12 7 Davis, supra note 83 at 33. Prior to 1948, Jews controlled only 6-7 per cent of the land within
the current boundaries of the state, yet today 93 per cent of all land in Israel is under direct state
control. Adalah's Report, supra note 26 at 3.
128 7 L.S.I. 43 (1952-1953). For a detailed discussion, see Kedar, supra note 52 at 952-69; Bisharat,
supra note 52 at 518-19; Davis, supra note 83 at 31-34.
129 See Falah, supra note 19 at 79. He explains that within a few years after this law was passed,
that state was able to transfer 1,225,174 dunums to its control, 325,000 dunums of which were privately
owned.
13 0 ]bid. See also, Maddrell, supra note 3 at 7.
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"abandoned" and, thereby, became subject to the Israeli conception of
empty space.'3' Moreover, when many Bedouin attempted to return to their
lands at the end of the enclosure period they were forced to either lease the
land or trespass. Consent to lease has been taken in court as proof that the
lessee did not have title. 132 Interestingly, in connection with the various
settlement initiatives proposed during the 1970s by the Israeli government,
establishing land ownership has proven relatively easy.'33 On the other
hand, where Bedouin have insisted on keeping their land, pre-1948 deeds
of purchase, Ottoman or British property tax receipts, and other similar
forms of evidence have been deemed by Israeli courts as insufficient proof
of ownership.
34
The Land Rights Settlement Ordinance (1969) 1 classified all mawat
lands as state property, unless formal legal title could be produced.
36
Although Israeli courts recognized that Bedouin had been living on the
lands, they would not recognize tents as settlements.1 3' Furthermore, the
courts denied that pastoralism as practiced by the Bedouin constituted
"working" the land.1 38 The last opportunity for Bedouin to register their
lands against mawat status had been in 1921,'139 at a time when their
131 Falah, supra note 6 at 42. For the specific amounts of land expropriated in the Negev and the
instalments see Jiryis, supra note 1 at 130-31.
132 El-Wakili v. State of Israel, (1983) H.C.J. 84/83, P.D. 37(4), 173 [El- Wakili], cited in Shamir,
supra note 30 at 245. For a detailed discussion ofmawat jurisprudence, see Kedar, supra note 52 at 952-
64.
The paltry sums offered in Israel attempts to compromise on land disputes, have been
characterized by the former Israeli government adviser on Arab affairs as "aggravated robbery" in the
eyes of the Bedouin. Falah, supra note 19 at 77.
134 Maddrell, supra note 3 at 8; Falah, supra note 19 at 76, noting that Israel has generally been
willing to recognize Bedouin land claims where Bedouin have agreed to sell.
135 23 L.S.I. 283.
136 The Ottoman Empire used a term called mawat (literally "dead") to describe land that was
unworked and more than 1.5 miles from the nearest settlement. For a detailed discussion of the
historical and statutory category of mawat see Shamir, supra note 30 at 238-42. Shamir notes that
Ottoman requirements for demonstrating that land was mawat actually involved showing that land was
(1) barren and (2) so distant from any town or village that the person with the loudest voice could not
be heard there, with the current rule being an adaptation during the British Mandate.
13 7 El-Riati v. Batcha, (1981) Ham. 827/81, D.C.B.S. 33(1) 329,332 cited in Shamir, supra note 30
at 240, n. 10.
138 Salim El-Huashla v. State of Israel, (1974) Civil Appeal 218/74, P.D. 38(3) 141 [El-Huashlla],
cited in Shamir, supra note 30 at 238-42.
139 Land Ordinance (Mawat) (1921), 38 I.R.5. This opportunity for registration was provided by
British Mandate authority so that it could assess unused land after assuming control from the Ottoman
empire. They followed the tradition of the Ottomans in only allowing such registrations periodically-a
sensible policy given the tribal movements and shifts that occurred over the course of Ottoman rule
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exclusive claim to ownership of the land was unchallenged. Until 1948, the
Bedouin themselves administered land usage in the Negev with minimal
interference from external authorities. The idea of registering land earned
the distrust of many Bedouin, who saw it as a means of control being
exerted by a foreign power. 140 As a result, few Bedouin at that time sought
to formally register their land.' As Falah points out, "The Bedouin, who
had an intimate knowledge of the land and had utilized it for centuries,
became the victims of a technicality, since they could not provide
documentary evidence to support their claims that satisfied Israeli law."' 42
The signing of Israel's peace treaty with Egypt also served as a
mechanism for the state expropriation of Bedouin land. Under the auspices
of the Negev LandAcquisition (Peace Treaty with Egypt) Law (1980) 143 large
tracts of Bedouin land were confiscated to purportedly build military bases
and an airport." No appeal process existed and compensation ranged from
two to fifteen per cent of that offered by Israel to Jewish settlers forced to
relocate from the Sinai. 45 The Bedouin were told that there was no time to
consult with them prior to the signing of the peace treaty (Camp David
Accords), and the resultant land acquisition plan immediately took effect
as law.'" In one instance, fifty-six thousand dunams of land were taken for
building a military base at Im Tinan. The base was never built, and in 1994
the land was turned over for use by Jewish farmers.
47
Home demolitions are the cornerstone of Israel's day-to-day policy
(16th-19th centuries). See Kedar, supra note 52 at 937-38.
140 Goering, supra note 115 at 7. See also Shamir, supra note 30 at 241.
141 See Maddrell,supra note 3 at 5, noting "[t]he Negev Beduins failure to register their tribal land
holdings must be seen in the context of the absence of any challenges to their rights at that time." See
also Access Denied, supra note 1 at 105-13.
14 2 Supra note 19 at 76. Maddrell, supra note 3 at 8, quotes an Israeli Interior Ministry official in
1978 who stated "the government will never recognize the Beduin's claims to ownership rights in the
Negev because they lack sufficient proof that the land belongs to them." Maddrell also notes that Israeli
law lecturer David Kretzmer has commented that it is impossible for the Bedouin to prove land
ownership in the current situation.
143 34 L.S.I. 190.
144 Falah, supra note 19 at 80; Maddrell, supra note 3 at 11.
Maddrell, ibid.
146 HRA Factsheet, supra note 9.
147 Ibid. The Israeli master plan for the Negev in 1976 noted the government's desire to use Negev
land claimed by the Bedouin for airports and other development, indicating that its expropriation was
planned long before the Camp David Accords (1979) or the passage of the law. According to Falah,
supra note 19 at 80, military needs served as a pretext for appropriating one of the few areas of Negev
land still in the hands of its original Bedouin inhabitants.
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aimed at forcibly evicting Bedouin from their homes in unrecognized
villages, and re-settling them in urban townships. 48 The phenomenon of the
unrecognized villages was a byproduct of the Planning and Building Law
(1965),149 which zoned all land in Israel as residential, agricultural, or
industrial. Certain Bedouin villages were "unrecognized" by the planning
scheme, their lands thereby being classified as agricultural.150 The law
forbade any form of unlicensed construction on agricultural
land-effectively subjecting any house in any unrecognized village to
demolition with a court order.' While ownership is often not disputed, the
law created a scheme whereby the whole community as well as each
individual home and building instantaneously became illegal.5 2 The fact
that the villages and homes may have existed prior to the enactment of the
statute, and even the state itself, was not a consideration overriding the fact
that they now existed on agricultural land. In fact, the Planning and Building
Law allows the courts to issue retroactive demolition orders. Residents of
unrecognized villages discovered that any extension or moderate
construction effort they might engage in was defined as being against the
public interest. Since the villages are unrecognized, they have never had any
local authority to whom they could apply for a change in the status of their
land. On the other hand, despite similar violations of planning and building
regulations in the Jewish sector, Jewish homes are never demolished.
Instead, the standard practice has generally been to retroactively grant
permits and exhibit tolerance towards unlicenced building in the Jewish
sector.
53
Legislation has also served to directly hinder the ability of the
Bedouin to engage in their traditional livelihoods. For example, the Plant
Protection (Damage by Goats) Law (1950) requires Bedouin shepherds to
get a permit from the Ministry of Agriculture to graze their goats on
148 See Maddrell, supra note 3 at 9. See generally, Amnesty Report, supra note 30 at 43-46.
19 L.S.I. 330.
15 0 Adalah's Report, supra note 26 at 34.
151 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. In 2003, the Israeli government demolished
approximately seventy-five Bedouin-owned buildings in the Negev, including homes, shops, a water
storage facility, and most provocatively, a mosque in the village of Tel al Milleh.
152 It is perhaps this dynamic that prompted MK Ophir Pines-Paz (Labor) to remark: "Whoever
agrees to the term 'unrecognized settlement' is lending a hand to the institutionalized discrimination
by all the government offices against Beduin citizens." Quoted in M. Shariv, "Knesset Negev Day
Focuses on Bedouin Needs" Jerusalem Post (28 November 2001).
153 Access Denied, supra note 1 at 235; and Amnesty Report, supra note 30 at 41.
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adjoining state lands, which are often military areas. 5' While the Israeli
government's claim is that this law is aimed at preventing overgrazing,
erosion, and desertification, there has been significant controversy
regarding the ecological justification for this law, and many have suggested
that it operates merely to wear down defiant Bedouins, insistent upon
maintaining their traditional lifestyles."' Permits are issued at the
discretion of ministry officials, and are generally accompanied by an
awkward condition stipulating that the state is not responsible for any
casualties. 56 During the first three years in operation, Bedouin flocks were
reduced from two hundred and twenty thousand to eighty thousand through
governmental action.
3. Implementing a Policy of Forced Transfer
Israeli policy towards the Bedouin is characterized by two central
aims. The first aim is to concentrate and sedentarize the Bedouin in order
to make their traditional land available for exclusively Jewish settlement
programs.'57 The second aim is to domesticate the indigenous Bedouin
community, making them available as a cheap source of wage labour for the
Jewish economy.'58 The legislative and policy tools used to achieve these
goals aim directly to cut the Bedouin off from their culture and make life
in the unrecognized villages unbearable until they are forced to move to the
townships.'59
1 54 HRA Factsheet, supra note 9.
155 Israel's three leading ecologists attacked the "Black Goat law" (as it has come to be known)
as outdated and erroneous in its suppositions, noting that there was no significant overgrazing in the
Negev highlands, which the Bedouin were prevented from using. Maddrell, supra note 3 at 13. See also
The Jerusalem Post (15 August 1978), cited in Falah, supra note 6 at 44.
15 6 HRA Factsheet, supra note 9.
157Access Denied, supra note 1 at 129-30; Maddrell, supra note 3 at 8; Falah, supra note 19 at 75.
158 Maddrell, supra note 3 at 8.
159 Ibid. Shmuel Rifman, former chairperson of the Ramat HaNegev Regional Council, made the
following comment:
What is happening today is the systemic seizure of state lands .... This is then accompanied
by phenomenon such as theft of property, delinquency and drugs. The problem is that our
struggle with the Bedouin has deep political roots. This is a struggle for land, and where
there is land there is blood .... We came to this country to establish a Jewish state in the Land
of Israel. Ben Gurion did not intend to establish a Bedouin state in the Negev.
Quoted in No Man's Land, supra note 14 at 15. See also, C. Bailey, "Barak, Shas, and the
Bedouin" Jerusalem Post (19 July 1999).
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Ensuring that the Bedouin can no longer sustain themselves
through traditional forms of employment is integral to Israel's forced
transfer policy. This objective has thus far been achieved through a variety
of administrative practices. For example, although the state has few
problems offering long term leases to Jewish farmers on land formerly
owned by the Bedouin, Bedouin farmers are generally only provided with
short-term leases that do not allow for permanent cultivation. 6 Moreover,
Bedouin farmers are not usually given water allowances, unlike their Jewish
counterparts. 161 No assistance is provided to Bedouin farmers in drought
years, while substantial assistance is provided to Jewish farmers operating
on long-term leases.
62
Efforts at making Bedouin agricultural pursuits untenable have also
been facilitated by the efforts of the Open Areas Inspection Unit, known
as the "Green Patrol." The Green Patrol was established in 1976 as an
attachment of the Ministry of Agriculture, and was led by Ariel Sharon
(now Prime Minister and then-Minister of Agriculture). 163 The Green
Patrol was founded to fight the so-called Bedouin incursion onto Israeli
lands, and was intended "to act as the executive arm of government
policy. ' ' "6 Falah explains that the Green Patrol is a paramilitary unit
comprised of twenty to thirty men deemed to be "nature activists," who
mobilize for special operations to pull down Bedouin tents, seize flocks, and
destroy crops planted without an appropriate permit. 165 Its continuous
expansion to speed up the urbanization of the Bedouin has been
characterized by numerous incidents of violence and unauthorized action.
160 Maddrell, supra note 3 at 12.
161 Ibid.; see also HRA Factsheet, supra note 9. While there never appears to be enough water to
accommodate Bedouin agricultural needs, the numerous agriculture-based Jewish kibbutzim and
moshavim in the Negev have had plenty of water.
16 2 
Ibid.
16 3 Current Prime Minister Ariel Sharon remains Israel's most controversial politician. In addition
to the Green Patrol, Sharon also founded Unit 101 in 1953, which was a small yet highly controversial
commando unit, known as the most aggressive unit within the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). See Falah,
supra note 6 at 43.
Falah, ibid. at 43.
16 5 HRA Factsheet, supra note 9; Falah, supra note 6 at 43; Maddrell, supra note 3 at 10. Maddrell
provides a comprehensive look at the comments various government officials have made regarding the
Green Patrol. She provides a survey of Bedouin attitudes towards the Green Patrol, and emphatically
calls for its disbandment. Despite its provocative actions, the Green Patrol has received little media
attention outside of the Israeli press.
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Allegations of excessive brutality have been commonplace, 66 In 1983, the
High Court of Justice ruled against the Green Patrol for intentionally
disregarding a court-ordered injunction.167
Additionally, since 2002, the Israel Lands Administration has
frequently, without warning, sent airplanes to spray and destroy almost
7,500 acres of Bedouin crops with toxic chemicals. 168 According to a recent
detailed report by the Arab Association for Human Rights, the chemical
used by the government-Roundup-is not safe for aerial spraying.'
69
Moreover, the practice of aerial spraying is being used to bypass proper
legal channels in the state's unresolved land dispute with the Negev
Bedouin, in an effort to inflict physical and financial damage that forces the
Bedouin to abandon their homes in the unrecognized villages.70 The report
further discusses the manner in which this practice violates Bedouin human
rights, including the right to health, the right to a livelihood, the right to
work, and property rights generally.17' Reflecting upon this new practice,
Professor Yitzhak Nevo of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
commented:
Spraying crops is another means of extorting the Bedouin to accept townships. It's another
instrument of making their lives in villages unliveable and unbearable so as to get them to
accept the townships policy. When the crops are destroyed, the population is at risk of
malnutrition and hunger ... [a]nd that is what the government aims at, to use poverty and
hunger to coerce the Bedouin to accept townships policy.
1 2
166 For example, in August 1998, Sliman Abu Jlidan of the Azazmeh tribe was shot dead by a
member of the Green Patrol for straying into a closed area and fleeing when challenged. See HRA
Factsheet, supra note 9; Maddrell, supra note 3 at 10.
167 See Jerusalem Post (2 March 1983), cited in Maddrell, supra note 3 at 10.
168 See Arab Association for Human Rights, ByAll Means Possible:A Report on Destruction by the
State of Crops of Bedouin Citizens in the Naqab (Negev) by Aerial Spraying With Chemicals (Nazareth:
Arab Association for Human Rights, 2004); No Man's Land, supra note 14 at 17-20; Cook, supra note
118; and Amnesty Report, supra note 30 at 43.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid. See also State Department Report, supra note 44 at 20, noting "In addition, in April [2003],
the ILA sprayed chemical herbicide on 2,000 dunums [500 acres] of land belonging to several
unrecognized villages to compel residents to move into one of the seven townships."
On March 22, 2004, Adalah filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Israel on behalf of
Bedouin citizens whose land was sprayed with toxic chemicals and on behalf of various human rights
organizations. H.C. 2887/04, Saleem Abu Medeghem, et al. v. Israel Lands Administration, et al. (2004).
The petition, on numerous grounds, seeks an immediate halt to the practice spraying crops. On March
23, 2004, the Court issued an interim injunction preventing further spraying pending a ruling on the
petition. The petition is currently pending. Online: <http://www.adalah.org/eng/
legaladvocacycultural.php#2887>.
172 Quoted in Krieger, supra note 113.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 42, NO. 3
Perhaps the most disturbing action aimed at pressuring the Bedouin
to leave the unrecognized villages is the denial of all basic services and the
prevention of the development of any form of infrastructure. 17 3 No permits
for building are ever issued, and illegal construction projects are
exhaustively prosecuted. Given that as many as twelve people often live
within a Bedouin home in the unrecognized villages, the villages are made
unlivable through the deprivation of basic services. In fact, Article 157A of
the Planning and Building Law was specifically designed to dislodge
residents from unrecognized villages, by forbidding national utility
companies from connecting an unlicensed building to electricity, water, or
telephone networks. 17
4
Few unrecognized villages have any connections that allow for
running water, and clean drinking water is in short supply. 175 The quantity
and quality of available drinking water is far below the minimum health
standards stipulated by the World Health Organization. 76 In a case brought
before the International Water Tribunal, the Israeli government's policy
was declared illegal. The jury pronounced:
The jury is unable to countenance any governmental action which uses the denial of water
as a means of enforcing zoning or planning. These policies have a negative effect on the
health of the populations in the "unrecognized villages." The jury deplores the denial of
water of sufficient quantity and quality.
177
1 73 No Man 's Land, supra note 14 at 7-8. See also State Department Report, supra note 44 at 20; and
Amnesty Report, supra note 30 at 43.
174 Article 157A, supra note 149.
175 See No Man's Land, supra note 14 at 21-28 for a detailed discussion of the negative health
effects caused by the denial of access to running water from official connections in the unrecognized
villages. In 2001, Adalah filed a petition to the Supreme Court of Israel against the Minister of National
Infrastructure and other governmental organizations, demanding that water, like any other public good,
be allocated in an equal and non-discriminatory fashion. See H.C. 3586/01, The Regional Council for
Unrecognized Villages in the Naqab et al. v. The Minister of National Infrastructure, et al., decision
delivered 16 February 2003. The Court dismissed the petition in February 2003 based on the state's
representation that water access had been provided for five of the seven villages named in the
complaint, despite the fact that such access did not include connection of the villages to the water
network made available to Jewish agricultural settlements in the Negev.
1 76 HRA Factsheet, supra note 9.
177 The Galilee Society v. The State of Israel (1992), (International Water Tribunal) at paras. 6-8.
(19 February 1992). The tribunal is an unofficial forum for the resolution of international disputes
regarding water rights. Despite choosing to appear that the tribunal as a respondent, Israel has failed
to comply with the pronouncement of the jury.
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Almost no unrecognized villages are connected to a sewage network
or have adequate refuse disposal services. 178 Many homes do not have
bathrooms and cannot obtain permission to build them. Outbreaks of
diarrhea and jaundice are commonplace amongst children in these villages.
Moreover, no unrecognized villages in the Negev are connected to
electricity, and most villages must resort to running private generators that
barely suffice to provide lighting.179 According to a 2003 report prepared by
Physicians for Human Rights - Israel on health in the unrecognized villages,
"the residents of the unrecognized villages do not enjoy decent living
conditions and the provision of underlying determinants of health that are
essential for leading a healthy life." 80
Despite the lack of services in the unrecognized villages, the
government-established townships cannot be seen as a reasonable
alternative living arrangement. This is primarily because the towns rob the
Bedouin of their cultural identity and hinder their cultural and social
development. 81 Further, the townships, despite being "recognized," remain
the poorest recognized localities in Israel.182 They have no central sewage
systems, few paved roads, and a complete lack of local employment
opportunities. 183 Unlike the facilities provided to neighboring Jewish
communities, there is no provision for maintaining livestock or engaging in
agriculture. 184 It is no surprise that, as a result of these conditions, half of
the Bedouin population has refused to voluntarily surrender their homes
178 See No Man's Land, supra note 14 at 34-45, for a detailed discussion of the negative health
effects in the unrecognized villages due to the absence of a proper sewage system and adequate refuse
disposal.
1 79 TIid. at 28-34.
180 Ibid. at 84. The report placed the blame for the denial of such basic services squarely on the
Israeli government. It noted such deprivation "reflects a deliberate and long-standing policy on the part
of the Israeli government to deny these residents access to the basic services to which they are entitled
as human beings," and that the "lack of recognition and the neglect described in this report are the
product of an ideology that discriminates against the Palestinian minority in Israel, and against the Arab
Bedouin who live in the unrecognized villages of the Negev." For a detailed discussion of health issues
among the Bedouin of the Negev, see also Maddrell, supra note 3 at 17.
181 See supra note 24 and 25.
182 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. See also State Department Report, supra note 44 at
20, stating "The recognized Bedouin villages [the seven recognized townships] receive basic services
from the Government; however, they remain among the poorest communities in the country."
183 See supra note 24 and 25.
184 Ibid.
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and re-locate to official townships 8
From the government's perspective, the resoluteness of many
Bedouin to stay in the unrecognized villages may have reinforced the need
for more aggressive coercion.'86 In April 2003, the government unveiled a
USD $265 million five-year plan (2003-2007) regarding the Bedouin sector
in the Negev. The plan's stated objective is "to alter and improve the
situation of the Bedouin population in the Negev, relieve its distress,
arrange for orderly reordering of land in the Negev, and strengthen law
enforcement."' 87 It calls for the creation of seven new government-
established towns for the Bedouin in the Negev, completing the
development and infrastructure of the existing seven townships, contesting
and settling ownership claims and land arrangements, a massive
reinforcement of officials for enforcing the state's right to land, enforcing
the various planning and construction laws discussed above, and taking
actions against "trespassers."'88 However, this plan was issued as an
administrative order rather than through legislation, and reflects a lack of
consultation with the Bedouin community in the unrecognized villages and
a lack of any recognition of the Bedouin's historical land rights as an
indigenous population.' 89 Despite alternative proposals by Bedouin leaders
and several non-governmental organizations, the government authorities
have refused to even consider such options.1 9°
Simultaneously, work on new Jewish settlements in the Negev has
185 Ibid. Maddrell provides a detailed discussion of the hardships faced by Bedouin in the
townships, and of the deplorable lack of services available when compared with similarly situated Jewish
settlements, supra note 3 at 13-15. See also Falah, supra note 19 at 85-88.
186 The Amnesty Report, supra note 30, suggests that the government's designation of the Negev
as a priority area for absorption of new Jewish immigrants, rather than resoluteness on the part of the
Bedouin, has prompted the government's renewed determination to press forward with its aggressive
master plan. See also, Pomerance,supra note 110, suggesting that Jewish settlement efforts in the Negev
are being encouraged in order to tip the demographic scales to counter a rapidly growing Arab
population.
18 7 SeeAdalah Press Release, supra note 117. See also, Ginsburg, supra note 111.
188 Ibid. See especially, Cook, supra note 3.
189 Ibid. In 2000, the Association for Civil Rights In Israel (ACRI) petitioned the Supreme Court
of Israel demanding that the government include the Bedouin unrecognized villages in its zoning plan,
so that residents can obtain building permits and access to basic services. The petition noted that while
the government has established 106 Jewish agricultural settlements in the Negev, Bedouin agricultural
settlements remain unrecognized. The parties reached a settlement whereby the government agreed
to account for the development of rural Bedouin agricultural villages and consider the
recommendations of the Regional Council of Unrecognized Villages in the Negev in formulating its
regional zoning plan. For a more detailed discussion, see ACRI'S website, online:
<http://www.acri.org.il/english-acri/engine/story.asp?id = 89>.
190 Ibid.
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already begun, with the first Jewish community, Givot Bar, being built on
the land of the Araqeeb village, which was "temporarily" confiscated from
the Bedouin in 1953.'91 Givot Bar was hastily erected by a dozen Jewish
families in the middle of the night. Israeli Housing and Construction
Minister Effi Eitam explained that the move took place under cover of
darkness to immediately create facts on the ground in order to prevent the
Bedouin from appealing to the High Court of Justice.
192
The effect of Israeli legislation and policies on the Bedouin right to
adequate housing, as well as the general welfare and situation of the
Bedouin altogether, was noted with concern in the Concluding
Observations of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights at its thirtieth session in 2003:
The Committee continues to be concerned about the situation of the Bedouins residing in
Israel, and in particular those living in villages that are still unrecognized. Despite measures
by the state party to close the gap between the living conditions of Jews and Bedouins in the
Negev, the quality of living and housing conditions of the Bedouins continue to be significantly
lower, with limited or no access to water, electricity, and sanitation. Moreover, they continue
to be subjected on a regular basis to land confiscations, house demolitions, fines for building
"illegally," destruction of agricultural crops, fields and trees, and systematic harassment and
persecution by the Green Patrol, in order to force the Bedouins to resettle in "townships."
The Committee is also concerned that the present compensation scheme for Bedouins who
agree to resettle in "townships" is inadequate.
93
C. Bedouin Before Israeli Courts
Distinct legal consequences flow from the view of the Bedouin as
nomadic wanderers, and this has resulted in judicial decisions that violate
Bedouin rights. Generally, Israeli courts view the Bedouin as invisible
(rather than as legal entities with potential land ownership rights),
reflecting the Zionist narrative of the Negev as empty land. As Ronen
Shamir points out, "Once the Bedouin are placed on the side of nature,
judicial practices tend, on the one hand, to objectify the denial of Bedouin
claims of land ownership and, on the other hand, to facilitate state policies
of forcing the Bedouin into urban settlements."'1 94
191 See Cook, supra note 3. See also Pomerance, supra note 110.
192 See Arieh O'Sullivan, "New Village Irks Bedouin" Jerusalem Post (20 January 2004); and
Hilary L. Krieger, "Activists Petition Against Negev Settlement" Jerusalem Post (25 January 2004).
193 Supra note 55 at para. 27 [emphasis added].
1 94 Shamir, supra note 30 at 231. See also Kedar, supra note 52 at 929-30, noting "the Israeli legal
system used procedural and evidentiary rules in ways that curtailed the chances of Arab landholders
from retaining their land. As a result, while Israeli rules of property were undergoing a transformation
that facilitated the acquisition of land from Arab landholders, the legal system bestowed upon this
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Israeli judges have continuously used rigid notions of land
ownership and title, refusing to examine whether such legal categories are
simply inapplicable to Bedouin claims. Where openings for potential legal
challenges exist, they are often closed off by stringent demands for
documentation or limitation periods.1 9 Through an objectification of
Bedouin land claims, the judiciary plays a critical role in turning the faulty
Zionist vision of the Negev as an empty space awaiting Jewish settlement
into a "taken-for-granted objective reality.' 196
In the El-Huashlla 97 case, thirteen Bedouins asked the Supreme
Court of Israel to uphold their ownership rights over several plots of land
on the basis that their rights over said property had existed for generations.
The state defended its expropriation of the lands based on the Land Rights
Settlement Ordinance (1969), 198 which had stipulated that the land was
mawat ("dead") unless a formal title could be produced. Since the Bedouin
could produce no such title, they were forced to argue that the land was not
mawat, and presented evidence indicating the existence of a nearby
settlement (Seer) that might bring the classification of the land outside the
scope of the law.1 99 The Court held that Bedouin tents do not constitute
settlements,200 that Bedouin pastoralism did not constitute "working" the
land in a productive fashion, and denied the claim, stating:
The Court has before it a description of the area, as it had been observed by those who
toured the Negev in the middle of the previous century. This description reveals that in the
said area there had been no village and no agriculture, and except for a Bedouin tent-
encampment and wild vegetation the whole area was nothing but barren desert.2°1
transformation an aura of inevitability and naturalness."
195 This is an interesting issue given that most Bedouin land claimants were in a restricted
enclosure zone at the time of state expropriation. See generally the discussion of the El-Wakili case in
Shamir, supra note 30 at 243. Kedar,supra note 52 at 956, notes that "Settler courts often use procedural
and evidentiary tools to curtail the possibility of native possessors retaining the land they occupy.
Similarly, Israeli jurisprudence imposed heavy evidentiary onuses on the possessors. This suited the
demand for 'modem' and written evidence, a particularly forbidding requirement for the typical
Bedouin landholder."
196 Shamir, supra note 30 at 236.
1 9 7 El-Huashlla, supra note 138.
1 9 8 Supra note 135.
199 Ibid.
200See El-Riati v. Batcha, supra note 139, where the court denied an injunction against moving a
Bedouin tent, stating that Bedouin tents were by their nature mobile objects designed for movement,
and hence relocation would have no injurious impact on nomadic peoples.
201 El-Huashlla, supra note 138 [emphasis added].
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InAbu-Solb v. Israel LandAuthority,2 the Supreme Court of Israel
gave resounding support to the dominant conception of the Negev as
empty. Bedouin appellants argued that their lands had been taken
"fraudulently" under the Land Rights Settlement Ordinance (1969), since
they were not notified of proceedings to transfer their lands to state
ownership, as required under the law. They claimed ownership of certain
plots of land they had worked and possessed "for years. 203 This argument,
and subsequently the appeal as a whole, was dismissed because the Bedouin
could not have been residing in those areas for years, as they were in the
enclosure zone for an eighteen year period. The Court relied on witnesses
who claimed that they never saw any Bedouins in the Negev during that
period. The Bedouin claim was denied because the desert was viewed as
empty, based on the undeniable legal fact that the state had officially
emptied it. This was treated by the Court as a straightforward logical
conclusion. If Bedouin were on the land at the time in question, they were
there illegally because they should have been in the enclosure zone and, as
such, could not profit from their wrongdoing. Moreover, the fact that the
Bedouin did not receive notice was irrelevant because the registrations
were posted in all Jewish settlements, which were the only legal places such
postings could occur.
Thus, under the provisions of the Planning and Construction Law
the Bedouin living in the unrecognized villages have been reduced from
possible claimants in land ownership disputes with the government to
criminal defendants. Currently, injunctions to stop demolition orders for
illegal construction are the primary source of litigation involving Bedouin
claimants. Lawyers generally seek to argue that the individual case involves
exceptional circumstances, rather than insisting that the law perpetuates
historical injustice and oppression. 204 This trend is a product of the judges'
and prosecutors' use of a wide array of precedents to support the claim that
past injustice does not excuse present lawlessness. Even where the
unfortunate historical circumstances of the Bedouin are noted, these
concerns are dismissed by an emphasis on the rule of law (and its attendant
formal provisions).2o5 The Supreme Court of Israel has frequently inverted
history so that Israeli law precedes Bedouin claims, and thus informs a
conceptual scheme that views state policy as intended to foster Bedouin
202 (1986) Civil Appeal 518/86, P.D. 43(4), 297.
203 Ibid. Discussed and translated in Shamir, supra note 30 at 244.
204 See Shamir, supra note 30 at 247.
205 Ibid.
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prosperity and development.2 °6
In EI-Sanaa v. District Committee for the Southern District,2 7
demolition orders were issued to Bedouins who had moved into a planned
township but who had not yet obtained construction permits. For failing to
comply, the Bedouins were fined and sentenced to a year in prison. On
appeal, the court held that while it could not justify the illegal building, the
exceptional circumstances in this case merited leniency. Thus, the court was
able to appear both benevolent and firm, while simultaneously disregarding
Bedouin historical oppression by the state, and declaring the collective
practices of the Bedouin illegal as an objective fact.
A further example of the court's conception of Bedouin land rights
is exemplified in Avitan v. Israel Land Authority. °8 In this case, a Jewish
police officer asked the court to overturn an administrative decision
denying him the right to lease land in a Bedouin township at the reduced
leasing fees enjoyed by the Bedouin. In denying the request, the Court
considered the history and tribal culture of the Bedouin, and stated:
At stake are Bedouins that lived for many years as nomads and their attempts to permanently
settle in one place failed and further involved law breaking activities, until a state interest to
help them had been established, in order to achieve important public goals.
209
IV. THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING
A. Adequate Housing and U.N. Instruments
Any discussion of the right to adequate housing must find its
starting point in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.210 The UDHR
marked the first time the right to adequate housing was enshrined in an
international human rights instrument. As an inspiration for the entire
human rights framework, the UDHR postulates how humans can live with the
maximum degree of freedom and fulfillment. Article 22 articulates an
206 Ibid.
207 (1987) Criminal Appeal 193/87, D.C.B.S. 49(2), 397 [EI-Sanaal, cited in Shamir, supra note 30
at 248.
208 Supra note 116.
2 09 Ibid. Quoted in Shamir, supra note 30 at 304.
210 G.A. Res. 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71 [UDHR].
Article 22 provides that, "Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is
entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with
the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable
for his dignity and the free development of his personality."
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overarching emphasis on the right to human development, and integrates
all branches of human rights (civil, political, economic, social, cultural)
within the rubric of greater human development.11
This emphasis on human development (individually and
collectively) underpins the need for specific concentration on the right to
adequate housing. Article 25 states: "Everyone has the right to a standard
of living adequate for the health and well being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services."
The fundamental importance of the right to adequate housing has
received greater attention as human rights law has evolved over the past
five decades. While the UDHR uses the language of indivisible legal rights,
and is considered by some to have the standing of customary international
law, its legal role has been as a catalyst for greater legal solidification of the
right to adequate housing within other U.N. covenants and conventions.
The right to adequate housing has legal foundations within several
binding instruments of international human rights law. These include some
of the most widely ratified treaties within the U.N. human rights
framework, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,212 the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights,213 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,214 the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms ofDiscriminationAgainst Women,215 and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child.216
The ICESCR offers the most legally significant provision on housing
rights in Article 11(1), which states:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing,
and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take
appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential
importance of international co-operation based on free consent.
211 See J. David Hulchanski & Scott Leckie, The Human Right to Adequate Housing: 1945-1999
(Geneva: Center on Housing Rights and Evictions, 2000) at 4-5. See also Dias & Leckie, supra note 8.
212 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976) [ICCPR].
213 16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) [IcESCR].
214 21 December 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969), Article 5.
215 GA Res. 34/180, UN GAOR, 1981, Supp. No. 46, UN Doc. A/34/46, 193, Article 14(2).
216 GA Res. 1386 (XIV) 14 U.N. GAOR, 1959, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4354, 19, Principle 4.
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Article 11(1) has been the subject of significant analysis and is the
leading international legal source on housing rights. As a party to the
ICESCR, Israel is bound by its terms, and obligations under it should be
reflected in Israel's domestic policy.217
The U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(CESCR) was established in 1986, and has done more than any other
international body to shape, define, and further the human right to
adequate housing. It was created by the Economic and Social Council
(ESOC) and is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the ICESCR.
In this capacity, the CESCR operates on the basis of reports from states
parties to the ICESCR, information from specialized U.N. agencies, NGO
reports, and generally available literature. As of January 2004, the CESCR
has adopted fifteen general comments dealing with various aspects of the
ICESCR. In developing an overview of the right to adequate housing within
the context of Israeli violations, this article focuses on four General
Comments in particular (General Comment nos. 3, 4, 7, 9).
B. Interpreting the Right to Adequate Housing
To many, the notion of "a right" to adequate housing has appeared
illusive and difficult to interpret. Critics have argued that it should be
viewed as a goal rather than as a right, that the notion of "adequate
housing" is too vague to be taken seriously, or that the requirement that
states provide "adequate housing" for their citizens imposes and
unreasonable and unfeasible burden.218 Such critiques are misleading.
Rather than unrealistically being required to instantly provide a home for
every citizen, states are simply required to use "all appropriate means" to
achieve the goal of universal housing. This demands that states not adopt
retrogressive legislation or polices that deny housing rights, or discriminate
in land planning and housing allocations. Moreover, the right to adequate
housing is a model of the interdependence of various human rights,
including civil and political rights. For example, it may be impossible to
maintain the right to security of person, public assembly, or education
where the right to adequate housing is compromised. In terms of
economic, social, and cultural rights, the right to adequate housing is an
essential component of the general right to an adequate standard of living.
Perhaps too much has been made of the word "housing," given that
legal interpretations of the right to adequate housing, discussed below,
217 Israel ratified the ICESCR on January 3, 1992, with no declarations or reservations.
218 See Dias & Leckie, supra note 8.
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clearly reflect the fact that it reaches beyond the provision of simple shelter.
Scott Leckie, the Executive Director of the Center on Housing Rights and
Evictions and a leading housing rights activist, explains:
Because the right to adequate housing encompasses a much broader range of concerns than
simply the direct provision of a dwelling to the homeless by the State, or reductionist notions
of housing constituting exclusively "four walls and a roof," this right must be understood
holistically as constituting both an independent right and a composite right comprising all
relevant human rights matters linked in any way to the existence, protection, and security of
the home .... An accurate view of housing rights must also recognize not only the physical
manifestations of a structure called "the home," but must equally embrace the procedural,
non-material aspects of housing rights, which, in many respects, may be ultimately more
fundamental than purely the issue of housing supply or availability.219
The issuance of the CESCR's General Comment No. 4: The right to
adequate housing2.. represents the most far-reaching and authoritative legal
interpretation of the right to adequate housing, and clearly established the
norms and guidelines that parties to the ICESCR must follow towards
implementing Article 11(1). While many of the fundamental principles
articulated in the General Comment are relevant in the Israeli context, the
focus in this section is on those principles that best address the implications
of Israeli policy towards the Bedouin.
Paragraph 7 of General Comment No. 4 stipulates that the right to
adequate housing should "not be interpreted in a narrow or restrictive
sense." The CESCR argues against a construction of the right to adequate
housing as simple shelter. The right to adequate housing involves "the right
to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity." In this paragraph, the
CESCR stresses the connection between the right to adequate housing and
other basic human rights. This theme is also echoed in paragraph 9,
highlighting the notion that the failure to protect housing rights is
tantamount to a slippery slope, in which other economic and social rights
are simultaneously rendered insecure.
The key value of this General Comment lies in its stringent and
structured treatment of the term "adequate." Paragraph 8 outlines seven
criteria that must be met before housing can truly be deemed adequate.
The general presumption that "adequate" housing cannot be pinned down
and must depend solely on a variety of domestic factors is dismissed. The
first such criterion is the "[l]egal security of tenure." The CESCR holds that
all persons should be safe to enjoy exclusive possession of their land and
property. Also, the CESCR calls for "genuine consultation with affected
2 19 Mid.
220 UN CESCR, 1992, UN Doc. E/1992/23 [General Comment No. 4].
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persons and groups" in implementing measures aimed at conferring legal
security of tenure. 2 ' Paragraph 8(b) argues that an adequate house must
contain facilities essential for health, security, comfort, and nutrition.
Sustainable access to potable drinking water, energy for cooking, refuse
disposal, site drainage, and emergency services are specifically mentioned
as entitlements of beneficiaries of the right to adequate housing. Paragraph
8(e) deals with accessibility and states: "Within many States parties,
increasing access to land by landless or impoverished segments of the
society should constitute a central policy goal." Paragraph 8(f) provides that
adequate housing must allow for access to employment options, health care
services, schools, and other social facilities. Thus, the interpretation of the
term "adequate" is incompatible with housing that deprives citizens of basic
services, especially when these services are generally available to the rest of
the population.222
Among the most important provisions for assessing the treatment
of the Bedouin population is paragraph 8(g). This paragraph provides:
"The way housing is constructed, the building materials used and the
policies supporting these must appropriately enable the expression of
cultural identity and diversity of housing., 223 Asserting that "adequate" in
fact means "culturally adequate," the CESCR goes well beyond the concept
of shelter, and ties housing rights to the cultural identity and development
of individuals and groups. According to this provision, housing is not
adequate if it merely provides shelter and services, even if ideal, while
neglecting the cultural ramifications of housing policy. This consideration
is, for obvious reasons, particularly salient in the context of the Negev
Bedouin.
Paragraph 11 of General Comment No. 4 provides that state parties
must give special consideration to those segments of the population already
living in unfavorable conditions. Policies that benefit those who are already
socially and economically advantaged at the expense of disadvantaged
groups are inconsistent with commitments under the ICESCR. The same
paragraph continues:
221 Ibid. at para. 8(a).
222 While international law generally provides that economic barriers should not hinder the
realization of economic and social rights, this issue is not particularly relevant in the Israeli context.
There has never been any reasonable claim suggesting that Israel cannot support the Bedouin right to
adequate housing based on a quantifiable lack of resources, particularly in light of the ample funding
available for the hundred or more Jewish agricultural settlements receiving basic services in the Negev.
223 Supra note 220 at para. 8(g).
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It would thus appear to the Committee that a general decline in living and housing
conditions, directly attributable to policy and legislative decisions by state parties, and in the
absence of accompanying compensatory measures, would be inconsistent with the obligations
under the Covenant.
22 4
Paragraph 12 mandates the adoption of a national housing strategy
that attempts to reconcile domestic policy with international legal
commitments arising out of Article 11 (1). Such a policy should once again
"reflect extensive genuine consultation with, and participation by, all of
those affected., 225 Paragraph 13 expands this requirement for state
monitoring efforts, and notes that reporting guidelines adopted by the
CESCR emphasize the need to "provide detailed information about those
groups within ... society that are vulnerable and disadvantaged with regard
to housing." Specifically included within an enumeration of these groups
are those living in "illegal" settlements, and those subject to forced
evictions.
Finally, paragraph 18 unequivocally declares "the Committee
considers that instances of forced eviction areprimafacie incompatible with
the requirements of the Covenant and can only be justified in the most
exceptional circumstances, and in accordance with the relevant principles
of international law." The right to adequate housing includes the right to
be protected from forced eviction.
C. Forced Evictions and the Right to Adequate Housing
Although General Comment No. 4 interprets forced evictions as a
prima facie violation of the right to adequate housing,226 it does not
comprehensively define what practices and policies might constitute forced
evictions. General Comment No. 7 is the most authoritative comment on
forced evictions and human rights within the international law
framework.2
7
General Comment No. 7 is innovative in several respects. First, it
provides a new approach in regards to the correlation between national
wealth and forced evictions, and insists that forced evictions are not an
appropriate catalyst for national development objectives. Second, it
224 See also General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States'Parties Obligations, UN CESCR, 1991,
UN Doc. E/1991/23 [General Comment No. 3]. It provides that states should not deliberately adopt
retrogressive measures.
225 Supra note 220 at para. 12.
22 6 Supra note 220.
227 General Comment No. 7, UN CESCR, 16th Sess., Annex IV, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22 (1997)
[General Comment No. 7].
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explicitly declares that evictions must not result in homelessness-those
who are subject to forced evictions must be provided reasonable alternative
housing and should not be subject to other human rights violations as a
result of their eviction. Third, it requires state parties to explore "all
feasible alternatives" prior to forced evictions. 228 Finally, General Comment
No. 7 focuses on the strict conditions under which forced evictions might be
deemed legal, reflecting the belief that there may be a variety of scenarios
in which they may be justifiable and consistent with international law.
"Forced evictions" are defined in paragraph 3, which states:
The term "forced evictions" as used throughout this general comment is defined as the
permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families and/or
communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and
access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection.
229
Paragraph 9 of General Comment No. 7 stresses that Article 2(1)230
of the Covenant, when read in conjunction with Article 11(1), requires
states parties to use all "appropriate means" to ensure the right to adequate
housing. This in turn means that states parties to the ICESCR have a positive
duty both to enact legislation to prevent forced evictions, and to actively
ensure that the law is enforced against state agents or third parties who
might be carrying such evictions out.
Paragraph 10 obliges states parties to consider Article 2(2) of the
iCESCR (non-discrimination provision) 231 and ensure that evictions that are
carried out do not embody discriminatory practices. Moreover, while the
General Comment provides that some evictions may be lawful, such
evictions must be carried out in a fashion consistent with the ICESCR,
ensuring that other human rights are not violated in the process, and
ensuring the availability of all legal recourses to the evicted parties.
Paragraph 13 states that all feasible alternatives must be explored
before any forced eviction is carried out, and that such alternatives must be
228 Ibid. at para. 13.
229 Ibid. at para. 3.
2 30 Article 2(1) of the ICESCR provides, "Each State party to the present Covenant undertakes to
take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including
particularly the adoption of legislative measures." This article forms the basis for the CESCR's General
Comment No. 3.
231 Article 2(2) of the ICESCR provides: "The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to
guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination
of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status."
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"explored in consultation with the affected persons." This paragraph also
provides that adequate compensation for any property affected must be
part of any eviction that does take place, and that the state must ensure an
"effective remedy" for persons whose rights have been violated, pursuant
to Article 2(2) of the ICCPR.
Paragraph 14 contemplates cases in which eviction is justified.
Lawful evictions must be carried out with due respect for the relevant
provisions of international human rights law. Moreover, relevant legislation
or laws that sanction evictions should clearly lay down the circumstances
under which they might be permissible. From this provision, it can be
extrapolated that evictions carried out that are either arbitrary or not
sanctioned by law, or both, are prima facie illegal, and as such cannot be
consistent with the right to adequate housing. It is also insufficient to
merely offer general circumstances in which interference with a person's
home may be acceptable; rather, a state party must specify the "precise
circumstances in which such interferences may be permitted.
' 232
Paragraph 15 provides that certain procedural protections should
exist when forced evictions occur. These include:
(i) an opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected;
(0) adequate and reasonable notice for all affected persons prior to the scheduled
date of eviction;
(k) information on the proposed evictions, and where applicable, on the alternative
purpose for which the land or housing is to be used, to be made available in
reasonable time to all those affected;
(1) especially where groups of people are involved, government officials or their
representatives to be present during an eviction;
(m) all persons carrying out the eviction to be properly identified;
(n) evictions not to take place in particularly bad weather or at night unless the
affected persons consent otherwise;
(0) provision of legal remedies; and
(p) provision, where possible, of legal aid to persons who are in need of it to seek
redress from the courts.
233
Paragraph 16 is extremely important in its insistence that evictions
should not lead to homelessness or render individuals vulnerable to other
human rights abuses. The paragraph provides that "[w]here those affected
are unable to provide for themselves, the State party must take all
232 Supra note 227 at para. 14.
233 Ibid. at para. 15.
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appropriate measures, to the maximum of its available resources, to ensure
that adequate alternative housing, resettlement or access to productive
land, as the case may be, is available. 234
D. Israel's International Legal Obligations
While the above sections provide an analysis of interpretations of
the right to adequate housing and the subject of forced evictions by the
ICESCR, these interpretations cannot be considered abstractly without an
examination of Israeli obligations under the ICESCR. To establish that Israel
violates the right to adequate housing, it is necessary to prove both that the
right is, in fact, being violated, and that Israel is legally obligated to prevent
such violations.
While the CESCR's General Comment No. 3 does not focus solely on
the right to adequate housing in Article 11(1), it attempts to clarify the
nature of state parties' obligations under the ICESCR in general. 235 Article
2 of the ICESCR has a special relationship with the entirety of the Covenant
in that it sets the guidelines by which states parties must actively seek to
implement its contents. Specifically, three contentions in General Comment
No. 3 are particularly applicable to Israel. First, while the Covenant
provides for progressive realization, "steps towards that goal must be taken
within a reasonably short time after the Covenant's entry into force for the
states concerned., 236 Second, this obligation to take steps quickly must be
pursued through "all appropriate means, including particularly the
adoption of legislative measures., 237 Third, beyond legislative measures, the
CESCR envisages that "all appropriate means" should include the provision
of domestic judicial remedies for violations of rights protected under the
ICESCR.
While General Comment No. 3 accepts that the ICESCR allows for a
flexible scheme of achieving the rights provided therein, specific steps must
be taken to make such a realization possible. The object of the iCESCR and
General Comment No. 3 is to establish clear legal obligations for states
parties with respect to fully realizing basic economic and social human
rights. As paragraph 9 of General Comment No. 3 concludes:
234 Ibid. at para. 16.
235 Supra note 224.
2 3 6 Ibid. at paras. 1-2.
237 Ibid. at para. 3.
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[The ICESCR] imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible
towards that goal. Moreover, any deliberately retrogressive measures in that regard would
require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to





General Comment No. 9 elaborates on the principles set down in
General Comment No. 3, particularly with regard to state parties' duty to
give effect to the ICESCR within their domestic legal systems.239 Paragraph
3 of General Comment No. 9 notes that the domestic application of the
ICESCR must be pursued in light of two principles of international law. The
first principle invokes Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (1969), which provides that "[a] party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
treaty., 240 The second principle invokes Article 8 of the UDHR, which
provides: "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by
the constitution or by law., 241' The CESCR goes on to state that although the
ICESCR has no article that explicitly obligates state parties to develop
judicial remedies,242 a justification for a failure to provide them would have
to show that the provision of such remedy were not "appropriate means"
for enforcing rights protected under the Covenant. The convergence of
these two principles suggests that the provision of judicial remedies for
economic and social rights is de facto mandatory. A party to the ICESCR
cannot invoke its internal law as a justification for failing to provide judicial
remedies, which is presumptively the only justification for arguing that
judicial remedies would be inappropriate means.
Paragraphs 4 and 5 provide that legally protected international
human rights should be directly applicable within the domestic legal system.
While no rigid specification of the means by which these rights should be
implemented domestically is provided, the CESCR specifies that the means
should be adequate to ensure just treatment. Moreover, paragraph 8 of the
CESCR "strongly encourages formal adoption or incorporation of the
Covenant in national law." Thus, a state that did not adopt any legislative
measures to protect economic and social rights (such as the right to
238 Ibid. at para. 9.
239 General Comment No. 9: The domestic application of the Convenant, UN CESCR, 1998, UN
Doc. E/C. 12/1998/24 [General Comment No. 9].
240 (1969) A/CONF.39/27.
241 Supra note 210.
242 Unlike Article 2(3) of the iCCPR, which does provide such an obligation.
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adequate housing) and afforded judicial remedies that did not countenance
international legal obligations, would in effect be failing in its obligations
under the Covenant. The overarching theme of this General Comment is
that persons living within the jurisdiction of any state that is party to the
ICESCR have the right to expect authorities (administrative and judicial) to
take Covenant rights into account when making decisions. The ICESCR
should have legal effect when protected parties seek to rely on its
guarantees, over and above domestic legal provisions. This is true
regardless of whether such rights have been formally incorporated into
domestic legislation. Moreover, it is not acceptable for the allocation of
resources to be exclusively within the political domain, to the extent that
challenges to government actions cannot be judicially resolved. Finally, in
paragraph 15, the CESCR provides that courts must take ICESCR rights into
account and ensure that state conduct is consistent with its obligations
under the Covenant. "Neglect by the courts of this responsibility is
incompatible with the principle of the rule of law, which must always be
taken to include respect for international human rights obligations.,'
243
When applied in the context of Article 11 (1) housing rights, General
Comment No. 9 can be read in conjunction with paragraph 17 of General
Comment No. 4, which is particularly interesting insofar as it suggests that
many components of the right to adequate housing are highly compatible
with the provision of domestic legal remedies. Such areas might include
legal appeals seeking injunctions against forced evictions or demolitions,
legal appeals seeking compensation following an illegal eviction, and legal
recourse allegations of discrimination in the allocation or availability of
housing.
V. APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS
A. The "Collective" Right to Adequate Housing
The analysis set forth above regarding Israeli legislative and policy
choices that violate the Bedouin right to adequate housing is based on the
concept of collective rights. Communities, and not just individuals, have the
right to adequate housing. Article 1(1) of the ICESCR stresses the need for
the self-determination of communities as a whole,2" and helps interpret the
community dimensions of the right to adequate housing in Article 11(1).
243 Supra note 239.
244 Article 1(1) ICESCR provides: "All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development."
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The Bedouin as a community are faced with a choice between living in
deplorable conditions, or being forcibly moved to an alternative location
against their wishes. By withholding services and preventing construction
in the unrecognized villages, Israel offers the possibility of an adequate
standard of living (although even that has been shown to be contentious in
the townships), only where the right to self-determination is sacrificed.
The policy of forcing the eviction of the Bedouin deprives the
Bedouin of equal rights as citizens. As pointed out above, the institutional
structures in place to promote statewide development cater only to Jewish
citizens. 45 While agricultural settlements for Jewish immigrants are built at
a rapid pace, including over 100 in the Negev since 1948, Israel has neither
created nor even recognized the existence of Bedouin agricultural
communities in the Negev.246 Meanwhile, Bedouin land in the Negev (and
other Palestinian land throughout the country) is expropriated pursuant to
a policy of furthering exclusively Jewish development. Although Israel is
not a party to the Apartheid Convention, the community dimension of
Article 11(1) is inherently violated by the existence of state-sanctioned
inequality. While the question of whether Israel can appropriately be
labeled an apartheid state remains a subject of considerable debate, clearly
those who retain only second-class citizenship can never hope to reach a
standard of living comparable to that of the favoured segment of the
population. At a minimum, the systematic manner in which the Bedouin are
deprived of their basic rights, discussed in depth above, provides
overwhelming evidence that they are the victims of a crime of apartheid
perpetrated by the Israeli state.
Looking closely at General Comment No. 4, it is clear that the
unrecognized villages do not meet the interpretation of "adequate" set
forth by the CESCR. Living in these unrecognized villages is quite distant
from living in "security, peace, and dignity." For instance, the Bedouin have
a birthrate that is amongst the highest in the world. However, despite rapid
population growth, Bedouin in unrecognized villages cannot engage in even
the most basic construction efforts, have access to few services, and
constantly face the potential of their homes being demolished. Intimidation
at the hands of the Green Patrol is commonplace, and Bedouin in the
unrecognized villages are forced to live in fear of governmental action
aimed at forcibly removing them from their homes. Israel has defined their
homes and lifestyles as incompatible with the discriminatory public interest.
No home falling within such a classification can be deemed adequate.
245 See supra notes 84-87.
246 See supra note 189.
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Paragraph 8 of General Comment No. 4 states that adequate
housing should involve the legal security of tenure. The Bedouin have no
such tenure and their homes have been categorically deemed illegal. This
condition exists despite the fact that many of these homes existed prior to
the legislation that made them illegal, and in most cases prior to the
existence of the state. Moreover, adequate housing should also include
services necessary for health, comfort, safety, and nutrition. However, the
unrecognized villages chronically lack basic services and are plagued by
poor sanitation and health conditions.4 7
An important element of the right to adequate housing is that it
should reflect "genuine consultation with affected persons and groups.,
248
This requirement is notoriously missing in the Israeli context. Bedouin
living in the unrecognized villages of the Negev have no recognized local
political representation. Israel launched its policy of sedentarizing the
Bedouin unilaterally while claiming to be acting in the best interests of the
Bedouin community. 49 Meanwhile, there exists no mainstream political
forum through which Bedouin living in the unrecognized villages can
address the Israeli policy directed at them. This, of course, supports the
theory that Israel's Bedouin policy, which is described in benevolent terms,
is in fact aimed at facilitating the mass expropriation of, and resultant
settlement building on, the remaining land in the Negev.
General Comment No. 4 also provides that the right to adequate
housing includes "culturally adequate housing." The above discussion of
culturally adequate housing above reveals that "adequate" housing is a
relative concept. In many cases, demolishing a person's home and putting
them in a tent would be considered a breach of the right to adequate
housing. In the Bedouin case, removing them from a tent and putting them
in urban homes is the same violation, manifested in an entirely different
way.250 The notion of "adequate" articulated in General Comment No. 4
goes well beyond the concept of shelter, and involves "the right to live
somewhere in security, peace, and dignity.2 51 The composition of the
townships does not pass such a test when cultural adequacy is considered.
247 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
248 Supra note 220 and accompanying text.
249 See supra note 116.
250 While some Bedouin continue to live in tents, others now generally live in tin shacks or older
homes made of stone or wood. I do not mean to suggest that those Bedouin who live in houses in the
unrecognized villages would find houses in the townships to be culturally adequate. Rather, I am using
the symbolism of tents and houses to indicate the difference between rural dwelling and urban dwelling
in the Bedouin context. Bedouin culture is essentially compromised by urbanization.
251 Supra note 220 at para. 7.
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Moreover, the townships do not provide access to productive land or
employment, and, as such, serve to unduly impoverish the Bedouin
population. The townships remain the most poorly funded localities in
Israel, and as noted earlier, rank at the bottom of every socio-economic
scale used by the state.
B. An Overarching Policy of Forced Evictions
To determine whether the totality of Israeli actions directed at the
Bedouin constitutes a policy of forced eviction, one need only look to the
definition of forced evictions provided in General Comment No. 7.2 3 Both
conditions set down in paragraph 4 are met. Bedouin families are being
removed from their homes in the unrecognized villages against their will,
and there are no appropriate provisions or legal protections being afforded
to them. Israeli policies do not simply involve displacing individual agents
from their homes, but also represent an effort to transfer an entire
community or society to an alternate location.
Home demolitions are only the final step in such a process. Each
time a Bedouin family moves out of an unrecognized village because it has
been made uninhabitable by the state, it is a forced eviction in that they are
being removed from their dwellings through state coercion. The denial of
basic services, the denial of traditional forms of employment, and the
unavailability of any modern conveniences enjoyed by other citizens of the
state all contribute to the forced eviction process. Home demolitions
operate as an outward symbol of a general governmental policy that ignores
the rights of the Bedouin by making it impossible for them to satisfy state-
supported planning and zoning policies while continuing to maintain an
agrarian lifestyle. In this respect, an emphasis on stopping home
demolitions through individual procedural challenges serves only to obscure
the systematic policy initiatives of the Israeli government.25 4
252 See supra notes 24-25. In December 2003, Adalah filed a petition to the Supreme Court of
Israel challenging the exclusion Arab towns from the government's National Priority List (a
discretionary list used to determine the localities in need of the greatest development resources). In
March 2004, the Court issued an order requiring the Attorney General to explain the exclusion of the
seven Bedouin townships in the Negev from the highest rating on the National Priority List for
educational resources. The case, H.C. 11163/03, The High Follow-up Commiteefor theArab Citizens of
Israel, et al. v. The Prime Minister of Israel, is pending.
253 Supra note 227 at para. 3.
254 For further discussion of the individualization of legal claims, see supra note 205 and
accompanying text. See also, Letter from Adalah Staff Attorney Marwan Dalal to former Israeli
Attorney General, Elyakim Rubenstein and others, dated July 11, 2001, demanding that the systematic
policy of home demolitions and a means to combat "illegal" construction be halted, online:
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According to paragraph 16 of General Comment No. 7, a state must
provide certain procedural safeguards if evictions are to be considered
lawful. In the case of the Bedouin, even such procedural protections do not
exist. There is no opportunity for the Bedouin to have genuine consultation
with the relevant authorities. Actions against the Bedouin are taken
unilaterally. Moreover, the fact that Bedouin villages are unrecognized
means that they have no political representation to voice their grievances
and potentially impact legislative choices. In the instant case, the Bedouin
play no active role in choosing their destinies, and can only reactively assert
their rights when faced with court-ordered demolition.
Moreover, the Bedouin are rarely provided with adequate and
reasonable notice of eviction. Since all homes in the unrecognized villages
are subject to demolition, the Bedouin are generally provided with an order
to demolish their homes themselves. If they fail to do this, in addition to
being criminally prosecuted, the state may take action and demolish the
home at any given time. As I have already pointed out, an eviction does not
occur only when the home is demolished by the state. Rather, a Bedouin
family can also be forcibly evicted when it is forced to demolish its own
home or simply leaves the dwelling against its will and out of fear and
insecurity.
Paragraph 16(c) of General Comment No. 7 requires that Bedouin
whose homes have been declared illegal should have reasonable access to
information regarding the alternative purpose for the land. In this case, the
alternative purpose is simply that the land has been classified as
agricultural. However, the land is not available for the agricultural pursuits
of the Bedouin themselves. The history of land expropriation in Israel leads
one to believe that land expropriation is being used to favour a distinct
segment of the population. In Jewish towns and villages, illegal building is
generally allowed and demolition orders are rarely issued.255 Moreover,
Jewish residents have an outlet to apply to for a change in the status of their
land where necessary. Clearly, the alternative purposes for the land are
imbued with discriminatory considerations that violate Article 2(2) of the
ICESCR.
25 6
Israel's failure to take any "appropriate means" towards ending the
forcible removal of Bedouin from the unrecognized villages disregards its
obligations under the ICESCR. The failure to offer any genuine consultation
with the Bedouin, the systematic denial of basic and essential services, and
<http://www.adalah.org/eng/pressreleases2001.php>.
255 See Access Denied, supra note 1 at 235.
256 See supra note 213.
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the methods used to curb traditional employment possibilities, all serve to
create a policy of forced evictions. Home demolitions are the most visible
manifestation of such a policy, although the mass exodus of Bedouin from
the unrecognized villages, and the substandard conditions in which those
who remain live, also demonstrate the existence of a prima facie policy of
forced evictions.
While the above analysis has shown the manner in which Israel
maintains an illegal policy of forced evictions, General Comment No. 7
contemplates situations in which such evictions might be justified. The
limitations clause in Article 4 of the ICESCR also suggests that violations of
Article 11(1) might be acceptable under certain stringently defined
conditions. Article 4 states:
[T]he State may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in
so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.1
57
While there are circumstances under which a forced eviction might
be justifiable, General Comments nos. 4 and 7 provide that such
circumstances must be exceptional and in accordance with the relevant
principles of international law. It is crucial to focus on the term
"exceptional circumstances." The Arab Bedouin have historically resided
in the unrecognized villages and are not accused of breaching legal duties
or contractual obligations. It is difficult to find exceptional circumstances
that merit their eviction. The U.N. fact sheet on forced evictions lists some
scenarios illustrative of exceptional circumstances:
(a) racist or other discriminatory statements, attacks or treatment by one tenant
against another
(b) unjustifiable destruction of rented property
(c) persistent non-payment of rent
(d) persistent anti-social behavior which threatens, harasses, or intimidates
(e) manifestly criminal behavior which threatens the rights of others
(f) the illegal occupation of property which is inhabited at the time of occupation
(g) the occupation of land or homes of occupied populations by an occupying power
258
257 Ibid.
258 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Forced Evictions and Human Rights:
Fact Sheet No. 25" (Geneva: United Nations, 1996), online: <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu6/2/fs25.htm>.
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None of the above circumstances exist in the case of the Bedouin
residing in the Negev. However, the above list is neither legally binding nor
exhaustive, and one might argue that other public policy reasons might
allow Israel to invoke the limitation clause contained in Article 4. Assuming
this is the case, the various mechanisms discussed in the General Comments
reveal that the onus is on the state to justify its actions when forced
evictions are a ramification of governmental policy-they must show that
there is an explicit justification supported by law and that it is consistent
with international legal commitments. A failure to do this will place the
state squarely in violation of the ICESCR.
Such a justification is not possible in the Israeli context. Before an
eviction can be justified in the public interest, the human costs of serving
that public interest must be weighed. In this case, the public interest is that
of supporting Jewish settlement building and agricultural pursuits, which is
in fact, supported by law. The public interest in question is not "for the
purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society," but
rather benefits only the members of one dominant group. Balanced against
the suffocation of Bedouin culture and the state's seemingly discriminatory
motives, Israel can hardly offer a satisfactory justification for the forced
eviction of the Bedouin population in the unrecognized villages. In fact,
where the public interest driving a forced eviction is itself contrary to
international legal commitments (as the discriminatory building of
settlements available to only one segment of the population certainly is), it
cannot serve as a legitimate justification. Where the conditions that caused
the homes to become illegal were based on discriminatory legislation, it is
absurd to suggest that the same legislation could be used to articulate
acceptable (according to international law) public policy reasons for
allowing their destruction.
Even if Israel could demonstrate that the transfer of Bedouin to
urban townships was a legitimate public interest in some fashion, it would
still have to demonstrate that forced eviction is the least drastic means of
achieving this goal. Israel has offered no legitimate incentive for the
Bedouin to move out of the unrecognized villages, and as such cannot claim
that they are turning to forced evictions after exhaustive alternative efforts.
As I suggested earlier, reasonable alternatives in genuine consultation with
the Bedouin have never been and are currently not being adequately
explored or pursued.
Paragraph 17 of General Comment No. 7 is extremely important in
that it requires suitable alternative housing in the event of a forced eviction.
When homes in unrecognized villages are destroyed, however, there is no
consideration as to how the family might maintain its traditional rural
lifestyle. The general presumption is that the evicted family will move to the
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townships, purchase housing through government subsidies (often
described as inadequate), and seek employment as urbanized wage
labourers. The Commission on Human Rights supports a similar
interpretation, stating:
[A]ll governments [should] provide immediate restitution, compensation, and/or appropriate
and sufficient alternative accommodation or land, consistent with their wishes and needs, to
persons and communities that have been forcibly evicted, following mutually satisfactory
negotiations with the affected persons or groups .... 2"
Thus, even if the forced eviction of Bedouin from the unrecognized
villages could somehow be justified, Israel would be required to
demonstrate that adequate alternative arrangements had been made. The
government-established townships categorically fail in this regard. Another
issue is whether the towns actually fulfill the objectives articulated by the
Israeli government, namely, to solve the pressing needs of the Bedouin
community in the areas of housing, social services, and economic prospects.
Given that the towns represent the poorest communities in Israel and are
characterized by a lack of infrastructure, the justifications put forward for
transferring the Bedouin are themselves contradicted by current conditions
in the townships.
C. Israel's Legal Obligations
Although the CESCR can monitor the implementation of the
Covenant, aid in its interpretation, and criticize state parties that fail to
comply, the ICESCR'S ultimate effectiveness rests with domestic
implementation. Thus, the CESCR has focused much attention on
appropriate legislative action and the provision of judicial remedies.
General Comment No. 9 calls for the provision of domestic judicial
remedies, through which Bedouin might be able to contest forced evictions
and assert their internationally protected human rights. Yet, the right to
adequate housing is not protected in Israel. At present, the only legal
avenue open to the Bedouin is to insist that their particular home does not
violate public interests, as defined by the Planning and Building Law (1965).
Since all homes in unrecognized villages are deemed to violate the public
interest, such challenges are generally futile. The absence of any security of
tenure makes ownership claims untenable. Even if the Bedouin tried to
assert their rights under the ICESCR, the Supreme Court of Israel has
accepted the proposition that international law is not automatically binding
259 Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1993/77 (10 March 1993), online:
<http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/fs25.htm#annexi>.
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upon Israeli courts.260 Israel's failure to allow domestic law to yield to
international law represents a further failure to meet its international legal
commitments, as interpreted by General Comment No. 9.
General Comment No. 9 also places special emphasis on the
desirability of the direct incorporation of the Covenant into domestic law.
Israel does not implement the ICESCR by any means that might ensure just
treatment. Thus, while the Bedouin may seek injunctions against
demolitions, they cannot invoke any law that yields the protections afforded
under the Covenant, nor can they invoke any rights afforded by the iCESCR.
Instead of legislating to protect economic, social, and cultural rights in
Israel, the state actively strips Bedouin of those rights through the
legislative and policy mechanisms discussed in Part III of this article, and
offers no mechanism by which the Bedouin can legally challenge violations
of their right to adequate housing.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that current efforts by Bedouin litigants to assert their
right to adequate housing and seek effective protections and remedies from
Israeli land planning policies will succeed. Israel has no formal constitution
in which the right to adequate housing is enshrined, and there is no
legislation that provides that right for minority citizens. Furthermore,
Israeli courts and judges are themselves imbued with an ideology that
marginalizes and negates the historical context of Bedouin land ownership
claims.
The cumulative effect of Israeli legislation and policy toward the
Bedouin constitutes a policy of forced eviction-a prima facie violation of
the right to adequate housing protected under Article 11(1) of the ICESCR.
These policies cannot be justified either on public interest grounds, or as
the result of exceptional circumstances. The foundations of Israeli policy as
it concerns the Bedouin are discriminatory and confer benefits to Jewish
citizens exclusively. Israel operates in violation of its international legal
commitments and should act to rectify such a failure immediately. If it does
not, Israel should be strictly condemned, censured, or potentially face
severe international action.
Looking ahead, an increased international focus on Israeli policies
260 Israel's international human rights treaty obligations have not been incorporated into Israeli
domestic law. Under Israeli law, incorporation of international law occurs only when the Knesset passes
a specific act or acts to that effect. However, principles which reflect provisions of customary
international law, are considered by Israeli courts to the extent that they are consistent with Israeli
legislation. Israeli courts have referred to particular provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) as reflecting principles of customary international law.
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that violate international human rights norms may force Israel to desist in
its policy of sedentarizing the Bedouin into urban townships. As has been
requested by many Bedouin community representatives, the Bedouin
should be allowed to establish agricultural villages, and the Planning and
Building Law should be amended or repealed accordingly. Similarly, the
2003 five-year plan for the Bedouin in the Negev should be replaced with
a program that reflects genuine consultation with the Bedouin community.
Numerous small Jewish settlements and kibbutzim, including more than
100 designated Jewish agricultural settlements, are scattered throughout
the Negev and have no difficulty obtaining basic services. Policy towards the
Bedouin should reflect the right to equality, the right to be free from racial
discrimination, and the right to participate in the design of policy and the
local governance of Bedouin communities. As the CESCR noted in its 2003
Concluding Observations:
The Committee further urges the State party to recognize all existing Bedouin villages, their
property rights, and their right to basic services, in particular water, and to desist from the
destruction and damaging of agricultural crops and fields, including in unrecognized villages.
The Committee further encourages the State party to adopt an adequate compensation
scheme that is open to redress for Bedouins who have agreed to resettle in the townships.26'
Judicially, a glimmer of hope still lies within the Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Freedom. While this semi-constitutional law contains no specific
provision guaranteeing equality for all citizens, there remains room to
argue that the concept of human dignity is meaningless without the right to
adequate housing. Those who live in fear of losing their homes endure
emotional toil and insecurity inconsistent with the right of all citizens to live
in dignity. Moreover, the connection between the right to adequate
housing, human dignity, and human development more generally is a well-
established principle underlying all human rights law. Litigation that
attempts to highlight this connection may yield more positive results than
what members of the Bedouin community have experienced in the past. If
the decisions of the Supreme Court of Israel in Qa'dan and Ministry of
ReligiousAffairs serve as precedents for more progressive judicial rulings on
equality rights, and more radically as catalysts for legislative and
administrative reforms, much will have been achieved.
Another legal avenue through which the right to adequate housing
continues to be asserted domestically is through the use of international law
as a persuasive tool. While the Israeli Knesset has disregarded international
legal concerns in creating legislation, the courts have often been receptive
to international legal principles and comparative constitutional analysis as
21 Supra note 55 at para. 43.
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interpretive considerations in reaching their verdicts.
Israel must also create a national housing strategy, along with
legislation, which aims to deal specifically with reducing poverty and
conferring security of tenure on those living in unrecognized villages. As
well, policies must be shifted in order to provide balanced funding to the
existing Bedouin townships, with a view to equal treatment with Jewish
communities of comparable size and structure. These steps must "reflect
genuine consultation with, and participation by," '62 members of the
Bedouin community.
262 Supra note 220 at para.12.
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